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THE MODERN HISTORY OF PROBABLE CAUSE 
WESLEY MACNEIL OLIVER • 
We often assume that those who wrote the Constitution understood its 
terms in a way that bears at least some similarity to the way we understand 
those terms today. This assumption is essential to the legitimacy of using 
Framing Era sources to inform the meaning of Constitutional provisions 
that regulate this system. This assumption is incorrect for one of the most 
important terms in criminal procedure. Probable cause meant something 
very different to the Framers than it means to modem lawyers. Probable 
cause was, as a practical matter, often nothing more than a pleading 
requirement for victims or officers who witnessed crimes. The modem 
notion of probable cause, an evidentiary threshold permitting a search or 
arrest that can be satisfied by the fruits of an officer's investigation, is a 
creation of the mid-nineteenth century. As with a number of Constitutional 
doctrines regulating the criminal justice system, we must look beyond the 
Framing Era to discover the origins of probable cause as it is understood by 
present-day lawyers. 
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a very basic premise: that the Framers understood the terms of their 
document as we understand them today. For one of the most important 
constitutional terms regulating modem criminal procedure-probable 
cause-that simply is not the case. 
In the Framers' victim-driven criminal justice system, probable cause 
was both more and less restrictive than it is under modem law. Probable 
cause was not enough to initiate a search or perform an arrest. Unless an 
officer saw a crime in progress, probable cause was sufficient for an arrest 
only if a victim attested that a crime had occurred. Officers were, therefore, 
most unlikely to act on mere suspicion, regardless of how strong it may be, 
lest they face civil damages. The Framing-Era criminal justice system did 
not, however, need to depend on officers investigating crimes and 
vigorously acting on their suspicions. An oath that a crime had occurred 
was all the evidence required for a victim to obtain a warrant to search for 
physical evidence in criminal cases. The victim merely had to assert that he 
had probable cause to suspect the person identified as the culprit, or had 
probable cause to believe evidence of a crime could be located in the 
identified location. Probable cause was essentially a pleading requirement 
that was easy for victims to satisfy but nearly impossible for public 
investigators in criminal cases to satisfy. 
The reasons those in the Framing Era relied on victims were twofold. 
First, the eighteenth-century criminal justice system had little choice but to 
rely on victims.1 The apparatus of law enforcement was in its infancy, ill-
equipped to investigate criminal activity as a matter of routine.2 
Furthermore, its officers did not enjoy a privileged status in the social 
hierarchy. Therefore, eighteenth-century constables and watchmen lacked 
the capability and even the public trust necessary to engage in criminal 
investigations. Second, the eighteenth-century criminal justice system could 
rely almost exclusively on victims. Victimless crimes were virtually 
unknown in the Framing Era, so there was little need for the eighteenth-
1. See George C. Thomas, III, Time Travel, Hovercrafts, and the Framers: James 
Madison Sees the Future and Rewrites the Fourth Amendment, 80 NOTRE DAME L. R.Ev. 
1451, 1468-69 (2005); J.M. Beattie, Early Detection: The Bow-Street Runners in Late 
Eighteenth-Century London, in POLICE DETECTIVES IN HISTORY 1750-1950 15 (Clive 
Emsley & Haia Shpayer-Makov, eds., 2006) (observing that "there were severe limits as to 
the help victims of crime could expect to receive from [constables]."); 3 J.N.P. STOKES, THE 
ICONOGRAPHY OF MANHATIAN ISLAND 642-44 (1918). 
2. Burt Neubome, The House was Quiet and the World was Calm The Reader 
Became the Book, 57 VANO. L. R.Ev. 2007, 2032 n.78 (2008) ("The civilian law enforcement 
authorities contemplated by the Founders did not include large professional police forces, 
which did not evolve until the middle of the nineteenth century. Instead, civilian law 
enforcement was the province of bounty hunters, individual officials, and/or ad hoc bodies, 
often using temporary personnel provided by powerful private interests or drawn from the 
local population."); see generally Wesley MacNeil Oliver, Magistrates' Examination, Police 
Interrogations, and Miranda-Like Rules in the Nineteenth Century, 81 TuL. L. R.Ev. 777 
(2007) (describing the rise of police interrogation). 
2011] THE MODERN HISTORY OF PROBABLE CAUSE 379 
century probable cause standard to authorize the intervention of the 
criminal justice system without a victim's complaint. Moreover, in a world 
in which victims were strictly liable for the fruitless searches they 
requested, there was little reason to require victims to provide more than 
their assurance that they had suspicion? 
The modem notion of probable cause, an evidentiary threshold that can 
be satisfied by anyone with relevant information, developed as society 
called for, and came to accept, modem police forces and began to regulate 
private moral practices. In no small part, metropolitan police forces were 
created for the express purpose of investigating and controlling crime. 4 The 
existence of these departments created pressure for a legal standard that did 
not require them to first ensure that a crime had been committed before 
arresting. The new standard developed despite the concerns created by the 
abuses of early police forces. 
These new law enforcement organizations would have soon discovered 
that they also had an interest in a legal rule that would allow them to 
conduct searches without a victim's complaint. Mid-nineteenth century 
moral crusaders, however, beat them to the punch. Statewide versions of 
Prohibition preceded National Prohibition by about seventy years and 
required a search and seizure mechanism for enforcing this victimless 
crime. Unwilling to grant temperance zealots crime victims' power to 
3. See Fabio Arcila, The Death of Suspicion, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1275, 1318 
(2010) (describing strict liability for affiant who sought fruitless search in the eighteenth 
century). 
4. There is substantial agreement that the immediate impetus for these new 
departments was a wave of nineteenth-century riots, though the mission statements of these 
new departments all included the investigation of crime. See Robert Libman & Michael 
Polin, Perspectives on Policing in Nineteenth Century America, 2 Soc. SCI. HIST. 346 ( 1978) 
(reviewing scholarship on the creation of early police forces); ALLEN STErNBERG, THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PHILADELPHIA, 1800-1880, at 119- 20 ( 1989) 
("Direct attempts at reform and efforts to retrain private prosecution made little contribution 
to the development of state prosecution. Instead, it emerged piecemeal, as a response to the 
increasing erosion of public order, primarily through the haphazard growth of the authority 
of the police."); SAMUEL WALKER, A CRITICAL HISTORY OF POLICE REFORM: THE 
EMERGENCE OF PROFESSIONALISM 4 { 1977) (contending that modem police forces were 
developed as a "consequence of an unprecedented wave of civil disorder that swept the 
nation between the 1830s and the 1870s."); see also MARILYNN JoHNSON, STREET JusTICE: A 
HISTORY OF POLICE VIOLENCE lN NEW YORK CITY 17-18 (2003). But see ERIC MONKKONEN, 
PoLICE IN URBAN AMERJCA, 1860-1920, at 56 (1981) (contending that cities seized the 
opportunity to create a mechanism of social control but were not motivated by any particular 
events); EDWIN G. BURROWS & MIKE WALLACE, GoTHAM: A HISTORY OF NEW YoRK CiTY TO 
1898, at 637- 38 (1999) (attributing to a brutal unsolved murder willingness ofNew Yorkers 
to finally accept a new police force); AMY GILMAN SR£BNICK, THE MYSTERIOUS DEATH OF 
MARY ROGERS: SEX AND CuLTURE lN NrNETEENTH-CENTURY NEW YORK 87 (1995) (noting a 
brutal unsolved murder as a source for New Yorkers' willingness to accept a new police 
force). 
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satisfy probable cause upon a mere plea, legislators offered a new method 
for obtaining a search warrant in liquor cases. Prohibition statutes required 
applicants for search warrants to describe the liquor sales they allegedly 
observed in order to obtain warrants to search a dwelling. This was the first 
time a warrant could be obtained in an ordinary criminal case by an 
investigator who, though he could not say with absolute certainty that a 
crime had been committed, could satisfy probable cause, understood as an 
evidentiary threshold. 
Therefore, probable cause, as we understand it today, is not the 
Framing-Era standard referred to in the Fourth Amendment.5 Probable 
cause as an evidentiary threshold effectively did not exist in criminal cases 
in the late eighteenth century. The origins of the modem standard lie neither 
with the Framers, nor in ancient doctrines that long preceded their work. 
Modem probable cause-a standard for criminal cases- was a by-product 
of the work of mid-nineteenth-century reformers. 
This article traces the mid-nineteenth-century development of this 
criminal standard believed to be of considerably older origins. Part I looks 
at the standard in the Framing Era, observing that there were two parallel 
tracks of law enforcement during this period. The enforcement of ordinary 
criminal laws depended on victims' complaints while customs and revenue 
enforcement could, obviously, not await the complaint of victim. In the 
early years of the country, these parallel tracks remained quite separate. 
Customs officials, who were no more harmed by violations than any other 
members of society, were necessarily required to obtain warrants on the 
basis of their investigations. Ordinary constables and watchmen, who 
enforced the general criminal law, could- and were expected to--rely on 
victims' investigations. 
These systems began to merge, as Part II describes, as Prohibitionists 
sought a mechanism to search for alcohol. There was considerable distrust 
of those zealots who would seek warrants, prompting a mechanism to 
ensure the accuracy and veracity of complaints in the cases of victimless 
crimes. Probable cause, the evidentiary threshold sufficient for a search that 
we know today, developed as victimless crimes made a new method of 
authorizing searches a necessity. Distrust of Prohibition investigators 
ensured that this new standard for victimless searches would not rely on the 
5. Many commentators have observed the increase in police officers' search and 
seizure powers beginning in the mid-nineteenth century with the creation of professional 
police departments, but no one has previously attempted to explain how feared rules giving 
extraordinary discretion to officers came to be accepted. See Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering 
the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REv. 547, 552 (1999); Carolyn B. Ramsey, In 
the Sweat Box: A Historical Perspective on the Detention of Material Witnesses, 6 OHIO ST. 
J. CRIM. L. 681, 689 (2009) (noting nineteenth-century "shift toward greater police powers 
over the suspect"); David Alan Sklansky, Is the Exclusionary Rule Obsolete?, 5 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 567, 579 (2008) (noting "dramatic" and "all encompassing" changes that 
accompanied creation of nineteenth-century police forces). 
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good faith of complainants as the criminal law had previously done. While 
the nineteenth-century version of Prohibition did not last, it left a search 
standard permitting magistrates to authorize search warrants on probable 
cause, as understood in the twenty-first century, alone. 
A standard that allowed a government intrusion once an investigator 
had sufficient evidence was obviously useful to the work of members of 
newly created metropolitan police departments. As Section III describes, 
this standard allowed them to arrest immediately when their investigations 
suggested the guilt of a suspect. Such a standard was nearly essential for the 
new forces to perform the role assigned to them of aggressively preventing 
and solving crime. The early years of at least one police department, the 
New York Metropolitan Police Department, reveal that early and frequent 
misconduct made the public understandably reluctant to trust these new 
officers. The interests of the new police department nevertheless prevailed 
and the new arrest standard was embraced. 
Probable cause as we understand it today, a foundational criminal law 
standard believed to substantially pre-date the Constitution, was thus not a 
criminal law standard at all in the eighteenth century. Rather, this standard, 
which alone justifies a search or arrest in a criminal case, is a creature of the 
mid-nineteenth century. At least in criminal cases, it meant something very 
different to the Framers than it means to modem lawyers. If history is to be 
a guide, its usefulness begins no earlier than the point at which our 
understanding of these terms began to map onto modem practice. For 
probable cause, that point occurred as law enforcement and Temperance 
interests first converged. 
I. VICTIMS DROVE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY CRIMINAL INvESTIGATIONS 
The rules governing ordinary criminal investigations recognized and 
marginalized the role of the eighteenth century's part-time law enforcement 
officers in the criminal justice system. They were the ministerial 
assistants-the muscle-for victims and magistrates who directed their 
searches and seizures.6 A victim's oath that a crime had occurred, and that 
he suspected a particular person, was both necessary and sufficient to 
initiate a criminal prosecution, leaving only a minor role for the constable? 
Customs officers, by contrast, could act on the basis of what they learned 
6. See Beattie, supra note I, at 15; Roger Lane, Urban Police in Nineteenth Century 
America, 1 S CRIM. & JusT. I, 5 (1992); H.B. Simpson, The Office of Constable, I 0 ENG. 
HIST. REv. 625,635-36 (1895). 
7. See Fabio Arcila, Jr., In the Trenches: Searches and the Mzsunderstood Common-
Law History of Suspicion and Probable Cause, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 17-45 (2007) 
(contending that magistrates in the Framing Era did not require applicants for warrants to 
provide facts supporting their suspicions); WILLIAM J. CUDDIHY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: 
ORIGINS AND ORIGINAL MEANING, 602-1791 754, 757 (2009). But see, Davies, supra note 5, 
at 623. 
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through their investigations. Unlike ordinary officers, they routinely sought 
warrants and acted without warrants. Ordinary officers could not act on any 
quantum of proof-probable cause or otherwise--with or without a 
warrant, unless a crime had actually occurred, typically requiring them to 
wait for victims' complaints. Probable cause alone therefore had no role in 
the ordinary criminal justice system. Until broader search and seizure 
powers were conferred on officers enforcing the criminal law in the mid-
nineteenth century, there were two very different schemes of search and 
seizure law in this country-one for criminal investigations, the other for 
customs and revenue enforcement. 
A. Criminal Investigations 
Early nineteenth-century criminal procedure severely limited the 
discretion of the majority of officers by effectively making them the 
ministerial assistants of magistrates and, ultimately, crime victims. Crime 
victims at the turn of the nineteenth century exercised the greatest 
discretion of any of the actors in the ordinary criminal justice system.8 For 
most crimes, they alone conducted the investigation, identified suspects, 
and determined whether their suspicions were adequate to initiate a criminal 
prosecution.9 Once victims announced their suspicions, constables were 
given fairly precise directions about the persons or property to seize.10 Even 
8. See William F. McDonald, Towards a Bicentennial Revolution in Criminal 
Justice: The Return of the Victim, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 649, 650-54 (1975). 
9. There seems to have been some variation in state practices, as one would logically 
expect in a world lacking modem instantaneous communication capability. Sources from 
some states suggest that applications for search or arrest warrants during the Framing Era 
required complainants to provide a factual basis for their suspicions. See Thomas Y. Davies, 
Can You Handle the Truth? The Framers Preserved Common Law Criminal and Arrest and 
Search Rules in "Due Process of Law" - ''Fourth Amendment Reasonableness" is Only a 
Modern, Destructive, Judicial Myth, 43 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 51, 90-91 (2010) (observing that 
the Virginia Constitution of 1776 and the North Carolina Constitution of 1777 required that 
criminal warrants be supported by "evidence of a fact committed," while the Massachusetts 
Constitution of 1780 required only that "the cause or foundation" for a warrant be 
"supported by oath or affirmation."). As discussed below, however, it seems likely that the 
practice even in Virginia and North Carolina did not involve complainants providing the 
factual basis for their suspicions. ln New York, for instance, even after a statute made a 
magistrate's duty to decide whether the facts offered by the complainant justified the 
warrant, in practice these magistrates do not have appear to have done anything other than 
accept the affiant's assertion that he had probable cause. 
10. See Beattie, supra note 1, at 15; Lane, supra note 6, at 5. The broad power of 
search incident to arrest would seem to undermine this claim and, as a matter of pure 
doctrine, surely it does. See discussion infra at note 43. The victim, however, accompanied 
the officer and directed his search. See 5 RICHARD BURN, TJ.ffi JUSTICE OF THE PEACE, AND 
P ARJSH OFFICER 199-200 ( 1776). This is not to say that there was not broad discretion in the 
eighteenth century to search for stolen goods. The discretion, however, was as a practical 
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when an officer had a sound basis for suspecting guilt, there was no 
mechanism for the officer to seek a warrant. An applicant for a warrant had 
to swear that a crime had been committed, which an officer could not do in 
most cases; 11 Before taking any action, a Colonial or early American officer 
responsible for enforcing the criminal law waited for a complainant to 
obtain a warrant, which shielded the officer from civil liability for fruitless 
searches or erroneous arrests. 12 Once the complaint was made, the officer 
relied on the victim's suspicions-he had no reason to conduct his own 
investigation.13 
Victims exercised extraordinary discretion in this system. A criminal 
action at the turn of the nineteenth century was generally commenced by 
securing a warrant for a suspect's arrest or a warrant to search for particular 
property.14 It was remarkably easy for crime victims to obtain arrest and 
matter, exercised by the victim of the crime, not the officer. 
11 . See Davies, supra note 5, at 622-23. 
12. The public had an intense fascination with search and seizure law at two points in 
American history: the era immediately preceding the American Revolution and during the 
effort to enforce national Prohibition. One of the critics of Prohibition, United States Senator 
A. Owsley Stanley of Kentucky (one of the country's largest producers of alcohol, then and 
now) observed that "the right to search and seize without a warrant was never vested in 
constables." A. Owsley Stanley, Search and Seizure: Senator Stanley Attacks 
Constitutionality of New Prohibition Act, N.Y. TIM.ES, Jan. 8, 1922, at 88. His conclusion 
was certainly correct with regard to the specific law enforcement officers to which he 
referred. See Davies, supra note 5, at 640-41 . Customs and revenue officers, since the 
earliest days of the republic, however, bad been vested with substantial powers of 
warrantless search and seizure. See Tracey Maclin, Let Sleeping Dogs Lie: Why the Supreme 
Court Should Leave Fourth Amendment History Unabridged, 82 B.U. L. REV. 895, 924 
(2002) (observing that the modem Court has used the broad powers of customs agents to 
search without warrants to justify searches to enforce ordinary domestic crimes). 
13. See discussion at supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
14. Arrest warrants were far more common in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries than search warrants. Search warrants were generally useful only in cases 
involving stolen items. In these collections, warrants in theft cases are more often for an 
arrest than for a search. ELUAH ADLOW, THRESHOLD OF JUSTICE: A JUDGE'S LIFE STORY 
(1973) (describing Judge Adlow's discovery of these documents); Barrett Warrants (1787-
1791), Gorham Warrants (1816-1818), Adlow Collection, Boston Public Library. Probable 
cause necessary to obtain a search warrant also permitted the applicant to obtain an arrest 
warrant. The very broad doctrine of search incident to arrest permitted an officer to search 
the arrestee' s entire house for the stolen item. TELFORD TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN 
CONSTTilJTJONAL INTERPRETATION 27- 29 (1969); Morgan Cloud, Searching Through 
History, Searching for History, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 1707, 1729 n.73 (1996) (describing 
Taylor's conclusion about a broad search incident to arrest doctrine as "noncontroversial"). 
Despite Cloud's conclusion, there bas been some debate about the scope of the 
doctrine of search incident to arrest. William Cuddihy colorfully described the scope as 
follows. "Anyone arrested {in the eighteenth century] could expect that not only his surface 
clothing but his body, luggage, and saddlebags would be searched and, perhaps, his shoes, 
socks, and mouth as well." Thomas, supra note l, at 1474 (citing CuDDIHY, supra note 7, at 
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search warrants, making public investigations unnecessary, at least in those 
cases in which the victim was fairly comfortable identifying the culprit. A 
complainant would appear before a magistrate and swear that a crime had 
occurred and that he had probable cause to believe the identified suspect 
guilty, or that evidence of the crime could be located in a particular 
location.15 His assertion of the injury associated with the crime-i.e., loss of 
property in a theft case-was sufficient to demonstrate that the crime had 
occurred. 
What it meant for the complainant to provide the magistrate probable 
cause has become the subject of a fairly intense debate in the academic 
community. Thomas Davies has argued that a complainant in the Framing 
Era was required to provide a magistrate with the facts upon which he 
based his suspicions and that the magistrate was to review the facts to 
determine whether they rose to the level of probable cause.16 By contrast, 
Fabio Arcila has contended that, as a .practical matter, probable cause was 
analogous to a pleading requirement.' He concludes that magistrates were 
not performinr a gatekeeper function at all when presented with requests 
for warrants.' According to Arcila, a victim was only required to swear 
that a crime had been committed and that he had probable cause to believe 
the named suspect was guilty or that evidence of the crime could be 
discovered in the identified location.19 Davies relies upon seventeenth- and 
eighteenth-century treatises that describe a magistrate as having a duty to 
consider the facts upon which the complainant relies for his suspicion .. 
Arcila relies upon justice of the peace manuals and form books of the same 
period which appear to require the magistrate to ensure only that the 
complainant bas sworn that a crime has occurred and that be, in fact, has 
847-48). George Thomas has quite reasonably responded that a society that strictly limited 
an officer's right to arrest a suspect would be reluctant to allow an officer to search "beyond 
what was necessary to disarm him." ld. While it is hard to argue with Thomas' logic, his 
conclusion seems undennioed by the few archived warrants that have survived from the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries in the Adlow Collection of the Boston Public 
Library. Victims of theft would have been interested in securing the evidence necessary to 
prove that the theft occurred and, far more importantly, ensuring the return of their property. 
If the search incident to arrest power were not quite so broad, one would expect search 
warrants rather than arrest warrants to have been issued in the vast majority of theft cases. 
15. Form of a Complaint to Obtain a Search Warrant, in GENTLEMEN OF THE BAR OF 
NEW YORK, THE AITORNEY'S COMPANION 435 (Poughkeepsie, N .Y., P. Potter & S. Potter 
1818). 
16. Davies, supra note 5, at 651-52; Thomas Y. Davies, An Account ofMapp v. Ohio 
that Misses the Larger Exclusionary Rule Story, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 619, 621-22, 624 n. 
19 (2007). 
17. See CUDDIHY, supra note 7, at 582 ("The general rule was that magistrates neither 
examined complainants independently to determine their adequacy for warrants nor withheld 
warrants if the assessment was negative."). See generally Arcila, supra note 7. 
18. See generally Arcila, supra note 7. 
19. See generally id. 
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probable cause. And while Davies points out that the form books contained 
explanatory notes reiterating the duty of the magistrate to determine that 
probable cause existed/0 it is the forms themselves, not the explanatory 
notes that followed, that appear to have driven the practice. As one might 
expect, government officials appear to have developed a practice of 
obtaining merely the information required to complete the forms. 
Legal treatises dating back to the seventeenth century observed that 
magistrates were to examine the facts supporting an application for an 
arrest or search warrant. This rule was announced by such legal luminaries 
as Matthew Hale, William Hawkins, and William Blackstone?1 There are, 
nevertheless, substantial reasons to believe that Arcila has accounted for the 
actual practice of eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century magistrates. 
In their landmark work on law enforcement in colonial New York, 
Julius Goebel and T. Raymond Naughton observe that magistrates around 
the turn of the eighteenth century occasionally declined to issue warrants 
requested of them, but that there were frequent complaints made that 
magistrates felt they had such discretion?2 A magistrate's review of the 
facts supporting a complainant's suspicion seems to have been an 
aberration and there was great public pressure to eliminate these 
aberrations. Further, if magistrates at the turn of the nineteenth century 
were requiring complainants to provide factual support for their suspicions, 
they made no record of these facts. The few actual warrant applications that 
have survived from the turn of the nineteenth century reveal that, consistent 
with the form books Arcila cites, warrant applications contained no 
recitation ofthe facts complainants relied upon.23 
Several pieces of evidence from the mid-nineteenth century provide 
further support for the conclusion. Oliver Barbour's treatise on New York 
criminal procedure observed in 1841 that, "[a ]t common law, it seems a 
magistrate might issue his warrant upon a general oath of suspicion merely. 
This was on the ground that the complainant was a competent judge of the 
matters upon which his suspicion rested."24 Henry Dutton's Connecticut 
20. See Davies, supra note 9 at 78 n.l22. 
21 . See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENT ARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 290-91 
(London, 1826) (1790); 2 MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 150 
(London, E. Rider, Little Britain 1800); 2 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE ON THE PLEAS OF 
THE CROWN 130-31 (Thomas Leach ed. 6th ed., London, His Majesty's Printer 1824) 
(1787). 
22. JULIUS GoEBEL, JR. & T. RAYMOND NAUGHTON, LAW ENFORCEMENT IN COLONIAL 
NEW YORK 424-25 (1944). 
23. See Barrett Warrants (1787- 1791), Gorham Warrants (1816-1818), supra note 14; 
Thomas Y. Davies, Revisiting the Fictional Originalism in Crawford 's "Cross-Examination 
Rule"- A Reply to Mr. Kry, 72 BROOK. L. REv. 557 (2007). 
24. OLIVER L. BARBOUR, THE MAGISTRATE'S C!uMJNAL LAW: A PRACTICAL TREATISE 
ON THE JURISDICTION, DUTY AND AUTiiORITY OF THE JUSTICES OF TilE PEACE IN THE STATE OF 
NEW-YORK, IN CRIMINAL CASES 454 (1841). Barbour's conclusion that New York state 
practice after the adoption of the Revised Laws of 1829 required an applicant to demonstrate 
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treatise observed that a ')ustice of the peace may issue a warrant to search 
for stolen goods; but to authorize this, there must be the oath of the 
applicant that the goods have been stolen
5 
and that he strongly suspects that 
they are concealed in a certain place."2 As a Justice of the Connecticut 
Supreme Court, Dutton would observe that the "oath of a person who lost 
the goods" swearing that he "has just grounds to suspect and does suspect 
that the goods were taken by [the identified culprit]" was sufficient to 
obtain a search warrant.26 
Finally, mid-nineteenth-century courts were obsessed about the specific 
language in the complaint, which was generally contained in the pre-printed 
portion of a form that the complainant filled out?7 State courts found search 
and arrest warrants invalid because the complainant had sworn that he "had 
cause to suspect and did suspect" that the identified person was the culprit, 
or that evidence of his crime could be found in a particular location?8 The 
the factual basis of his suspicions to a magistrate was demonstrated to be false-at least as a 
practical matter-with the reports of the Commissioner on Pleading and Practice, who 
observed that magistrates were not examining the factual foundation at all. See discussion 
infra notes 36-37 and accompanying text. 
25. HENRY DUTTON, A REVISION OF SWIFT'S DIGESTS ON THE LAWS OF CONNECTICUT 
505 (New Haven, Durrie & Peck 1851). For a more complete description of Henry Dutton' s 
life, see discussion infra note 26. 
26. Lowrey v. Gridley, 30 Conn. 450, 456-57 (Conn. 1862). Connecticut is admittedly 
not a typical case. Henry Dutton had a clear motive to resolve any ambiguity about a 
magistrate's duty to examine the facts supporting a complainant's requested warrant in favor 
of not requiring such an examination. Dutton, a Yale Law Professor in 1851, wrote his 
treatise prior to advocating passage of the state's prohibitory law as a member of the 
legislature. The law he advocated contained the most permissive search standard in the 
country. See YALE UNIVERSITY, OBITUARY RECORD OF GRADUATES OF YALE COLLEGE: 
DECEASED FROM JULY, 1859 TO JULY, 1870 (New Haven, Tuttle Morehouse & Taylor 1870); 
Letter to the Editor, HARTFORD COURANT, April 21 , 1854, at 2 (describing Dutton's role); 
The Maine Liquor Law- As just passed by the Connecticut Legislature, NEW YORK TIMES, 
June 22, 1854 (describing law). The mere allegation of three persons that liquor was present 
in a home was sufficient to obtain a warrant under this statute. Jd. The same legislature that 
enacted the prohibitory law, elected him Governor of Connecticut. He subsequently became 
a justice on the state supreme court, where in the Lowrey case he was asked to pass on the 
constitutionality of the search and seizure process permitted under the statute. Dutton 
reasoned that the liquor law was more protective of individual liberty than searches for 
stolen goods, which could proceed on the mere allegation of a single person that the goods 
were in a particular location. Lowrey, 30 Conn. at 456-57. One could reasonably surmise 
that Dutton was laying the legal groundwork for the Lowrey decision for over a decade, even 
though it would be a stretch to suppose that he saw himself writing it ten years later. 
27. Form of a Complaint, supra note 15; 2 N.Y. REv. STAT., pt. 4, cb. 2, tit. 2 (1836); 
Mass. Rev. Stat. title II, ch. 142, § 1 (1836). 
28. See Thomas Y. Davies, The Fictional Character of Law and Order Originalism: A 
Case Study of the Distortions and Evasions of Framing Era Arrest Doctrine in Atwater v. 
Lago Vista, 37 WAKE. FOREST L. REv. 239, 381 n.480 (2002) (citing Humes v. Taber, 1 R.I. 
464, 465 (1850)). The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court similarly found that a search 
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courts found these warrant applications insufficient because the 
complainant had not demonstrated adequate certainty about his 
suspicions?9 Complainants in these states were thus required to swear that 
they had "probable cause to believe and did believe" that the identified 
person was the cul~rit, or that evidence of his crime could be located in the 
location identified. 0 If magistrates in the mid-nineteenth century reviewed 
the facts complainants offered, the complainant's characterization of his 
level of suspicion would have been irrelevant. The magistrate's independent 
determination that there was probable cause would have overcome any lack 
of certainty expressed in the form pleading used by the complainant. 
Magistrates certainly could-and did-reject warrant applications, but 
their rejections appear to have been based on concerns about complainants, 
not their complaints. This victim-driven system was willing to trust victims 
only so long as they appeared trustworthy. As one treatise writer observed, 
"Where a magistrate has reasonable ground to believe that the charge 
preferred is the offspring of malice and a corrupt heart, he may require 
further evidence of its truth than the oath of the complainant. "31 Somewhat 
warrant for lottery tickets based on a complainant's oath that he had "probable cause to 
suspect" the tickets present was insufficient. Commonwealth v. Certain Lottery Tickets, 59 
Mass. 369, 372 (Mass. 1850). Like Rhode Island, Massachusetts, by statute, required an 
applicant for a search warrant to swear that he believed the evidence could be discovered in 
the location identified. The court held that a warrant application "sworn to in the old form," 
i.e., the one used before the Massachusetts Revised Statutes of 1837, was invalid, at least for 
searches that had not previously been authorized on "suspicion" rather than "belief." !d. at 
3 72. The Massachusetts case offered something of a preview of issues that would arise with 
Prohibition. Massachusetts, unlike most states of the mid-nineteenth century, bad passed a 
statute authorizing a search for evidence of victimless crimes. Searches could be instituted in 
Massachusetts for counterfeit money, obscene publications, lottery tickets, or gaming 
devices. Mass. Rev. Stat. tit. 11, ch. 142 § 2. The Revised Statutes required a complainant to 
assert his "belief' in seeking all warrants, whether to search for stolen goods or evidence of 
the new victimless crimes. !d. at § 1. The court held that it was not required to consider, in 
this case involving lottery tickets, whether the old form was adequate for a search warrant to 
recover stolen goods. The suggestion that different standards might apply to searches for 
victimless crimes would reappear when Prohibition created a realistic threat that victimless 
crimes would be prosecuted. 
29. See Certain Lottery Tickets, 59 Mass. at 372. 
30. !d. 
31 . See JOHN C.B. DAVIS, THE MASSACHUSEITS JUSTICE: A TREATISE UPON THE 
POWERS AND DUTIES OF JUSTICES OF THE PEACE: WITH COPIOUS FORMS 192 (Worchester, 
Mass. 184 7) (also observing that the magistrate "may, also, upon deliberate consideration, 
refuse to institute a criminal process,'' suggesting that usual course was to grant requested 
warrant); see also BARBOUR, supra note 24, at 451 (stating that a magistrate "ought not . .. 
to proceed upon a complaint solely because such complaint has been made; for though there 
be a positive charge on oath by a competent witness, if the justice sees that no credit is to be 
given to it, he may, and should doubtless, decline acting on it"). Barbour's treatise did 
recognize that New York judges bad a duty to inquire into the facts supporting warrant 
applications. BARBOUR, supra note 24, at 454. This reference was, of course, to the 
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remarkably, victims were never required to provide any sort of surety when 
they requested arrest or search warrants. This is particularly striking in light 
of the fact that in the eighteenth century some authorities concluded that 
applicants for warrants were strictly liable in trespass for erroneous arrests 
or fruitless searches.32 By the mid-nineteenth century, the burden bad 
shifted. A victim of an improper search or arrest had the burden of proving 
that the complainant lacked probable cause, virtually immunizing him from 
suit.33 
The mid-century battle over state prohibitory laws provides further 
evidence that magistrates were not expected to scrutinize warrant 
applications. As will be discussed much more fully below, legislatures 
refused to authorize warrants to search for liquor that followed the same 
procedures used for ordinary search and arrest warrants.34 Prohibition bills 
permitting these warrants were accepted only after they were modified to 
require their applicants to explain why they believed alcohol could be 
discovered in the location indicated and a magistrate to find these facts 
provided probable cause. 35 If this procedure merely restated existing 
practice, it seemingly could not have ameliorated the concerns of even a 
single opponent of the proposed law. 
Whatever the actual practice at the turn of the nineteenth century, it is 
very clear that by the middle of the century, magistrates were not 
considering the grounds supporting a requested warrant, even when 
expressly required to do so by statute. Statutory revisions in New York in 
1829, and Massachusetts in 1836, contained provisions requiring a judge's 
evaluation of the facts supporting a complainant's fact, but magistrates 
ignored both provisions?6 The New York Commissioners on Pleading and 
requirement codified in New York's statutes of 1829, which would not be followed in 
practice. As a corollary, the reputation of the suspect was expressly identified as a sufficient 
basis for a magistrate to detennine that the complainant had demonstrated probable cause. 
See Joseph D. Grano, Probable Cause and Common Sense: A Reply to the Critics o/Illinois 
v. Gates, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 465, 481 n.94 (1983-84) (quoting William Hawkins' 
eighteenth-century treatise). 
32. See Entick v. Carrington, (1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B.); 2 Wilson 275 (Eng.). 
33. See Burns v. Erben, 40 N.Y. 463, 465 (N.Y. 1869) (in an action for malicious 
prosecution, "the burden was upon the plaintiff to show a want of probable cause."). 
34. See discussion infra notes 114-133 and accompanying text. 
3 5. See discussion infra notes 115- 133 and accompanying text. 
36. This is one example of the notice taken ofNew York's criminal procedure outside 
the Empire State. The Massachusetts legislature used virtually the identical language that the 
New York Legislature had used. GEORGE EDWARDS, A TREATISE ON TifE POWERS AND 
DUTIES Of JUSTICES OF THE PEACE AND TOWN OFFICERS IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK, UNDER 
THE REVISED STATUTES WITH PRACfiCAL fORMS (Ithaca, Mark, Andrus & Woodruff, 3rd ed. 
1836) (quoting N.Y. Rev. Stat. p. 746, Tit. 7, Part IV,§ 25 ("if such magistrate be satisfied 
that there is reasonable ground for [the complainant's] suspicion, he shall issue a warrant to 
search for such property.")); Mass. Rev. Stat. tit. 11, cb. 142, §1 (1836) ("if [the magistrate] 
be satisfied that there is reasonable cause for [the complainant's] belief, [he] sbaJI issue a 
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Practice, charged with the duty of producing a Code of Criminal Procedure, 
complained in 1850 of the "loose practice" of magistrates in issuing 
warrants. They observed that "[i]t is very common, for example, to state in 
cases of larceny, nothing more, than that the property was stolen taken 
away &c., by the person charged. "37 
There were no penalties for ignoring statutory provisions requiring 
magistrates to assess the strength of the facts supporting a victim's 
allegation of probable cause. As an example of this, the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court held in 1841 that there was no remedy against a 
magistrate for granting a warrant without considering the facts supporting 
the complainant's allegation, or against the complainant for requesting ir8: 
The great security of the citizen from unreasonable arrest or seizure of 
goods is this, that the warrant is only to issue upon the oath of the 
complainant alleging a larceny, &c., and his belief that the party accused 
is guilty of the offence; or, in the case of seizure on a search warrant, that 
he believes the property stolen, embezzled, &c., to be in the place 
searched. J!> 
This system placed great trust in victims who, by the mid-nineteenth 
century, were liable for malicious prosecution only if the target of the 
invest~ation could demonstrate that the complainant lacked probable 
cause. When a crime victim went to the magistrate, he sought one of two 
types of warrants to initiate a criminal action. If he swore he knew who had 
committed the crime, he requested a warrant for the culprit's arrest; if he 
swore he knew where stolen goods could be found, he asked for a search 
warrant. For a varie~ of reasons, arrest warrants were far more common 
than search warrants. 1 In a world before forensic science, the only type of 
search warrant that would have been useful to a victim was one to recover 
stolen goods.42 Further, the doctrine of search incident to arrest was 
extremely broad in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. If a 
victim swore he had probable cause to believe a particular person had stolen 
warrant to search for such property."). 
37. SELECT COMMrrrEE ON CODE OF CRJ.MJNAL PROCEDURE, REPORT, DOCUMENTS OF 
THE ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, 78th Sess., No. 150, at 79, § 149 (1855). 
(hereinafter CRJMINAL CODE]. 
38. Stone v. Dana, 46 Mass. (5 Mete.) 98 (1842). 
39. /d. at 109-110. 
40. See discussion at supra note 33. 
41. See e.g., Barrett Warrants (1787- 1791), Gorham Warrants (1816--1818), supra 
note 14. 
42. It is frequently stated that the common law only pennitted searches for stolen 
goods, which is true, but there is a caveat: certain statutes allowed searches for smuggled 
goods and dangerous items, such as gunpowder or diseased or infected animals. Akhil Reed 
Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARv. L. REv. 757,765 (1994). 
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his property, an arrest warrant would have permitted his apprehension as 
well as a search of his premises for the missing items.43 
State officers exercised almost no discretion in the investigatory or 
prosecutorial process. The constable's role in the criminal case ended with 
the arrest and any search that accompanied it. The magistrate was the ontz 
participant in the criminal justice system expected to question suspects. 
The constable was not expected to question the suspect.45 Some English 
authorities at the turn of the nineteenth century actually forbid the constable 
to question the suspect, though American authorities never adopted this 
position.46 In the United States, custom and lack of institutional incentive 
were likely sufficient to prevent the practice of routine police interrogation 
from developing before the creation of professional police departments.47 
Beyond this, any inducement or promise held out by a constable threatened 
the admissibility of the statement the accused made further discouraging 
any effort at interrogation.48 
Limitations on the officers power to investigate criminal matters, either 
pre-arrest or post-arrest were as much a function of customary practice, 
institutional incentives (or a lack thereof), and the constable's social 
standing (or lack thereof).49 The history of a particularly despised type form 
of investigatory authority illustrates this point. Though they no longer 
existed at the time the United States Constitution was written, general 
43. See TAYLOR, supra note 14, at 27-29. 
44. See Albert W. Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege in Historical Perspective: The Right 
to Remain Silent, 94 MrcH. L. REV. 2625 (1996) (observing inconsistency between Fifth 
Amendment right to remain silent and routine practice of magistrates to interrogate 
suspects). 
45. See Steven Penney, Theories of Confession Admissibility: A Historical View, 25 
AM. J. CRIM. L. 309, 323 (1998) (observing that the duties of sheriffs, constables, and 
watchmen "did not generally include either the investigation of unsolved crimes or the 
interrogation of suspects"). 
46. See 1 S. MARCH PHILLIPPS, TREATISE ON mE LAW OF EVIDENCE 406 (New York, 
Banks, Gould & Co., 3rd ed. I849) (citing Rex v. Wilson (1817) 171 Eng. Rep. 353, 353; 7 
Holt 596.). ("A confession, obtained without threat or promise has been received, 
notwithstanding it was elicited by a police officer.") Phillips and Amos noted, however, that 
there were English authorities to the contrary of this proposition. !d. (citing Rex v. Wilson 
( 1817) 171 Eng. Rep. 353, 353; 7 Holt 596). 
4 7. There were rare instances of officers performing interrogations and likely involved 
cases involving rewards. See Oliver, supra note 2, at 795 n.I 00, 797 (2007). 
48. By the mid-nineteenth century, there was a growing consensus in England that any 
police interrogation rendered a statement involuntary. See Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 
532, 556 (1897) (describing English voluntariness rule). 
49. Justice White concluded that the primary limitation on eighteenth-century officers 
was "the generally ministerial nature of the constable's office at common law." Payton v. 
New York, 445 U.S. 573, 607 (1980) (White, J., dissenting). Justice White was incorrect in 
concluding that "the constable possessed broad inherent powers to arrest," but his 
assessment of the institutional limits on early officers is certainly correct./d 
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warrants, permitting the officer to search wherever he suspected, or arrest 
anyone he suspected of committing the crime in question, had been fairly 
common in early colonial era.50 Yet the American colonists were never 
outraged by the authority exercised by constables when they used these 
warrants.51 The reason for this was that that in practice, constables bearing 
these general warrants searched those only places, and arrested only those 
persons identified by the complaining victims who sought warrants. 52 
Controversies over general warrants in customs enforcement led to their 
quiet replacement with specific warrants in criminal cases. As will be 
discussed below, general warrants for customs searches were much less 
comfortably tolerated.53 When ordinary officers were entrusted with great 
discretion, they were practically prevented from exercising it; the informal 
limits were as important as the formal. 54 
The formal limits were, however, far from insignificant. An officer's 
authority to act without a warrant prior to the mid-nineteenth century was 
quite limited.55 He had authority to search without a warrant only incident 
to arrest, and only under very narrow circumstances could an officer arrest 
without a warrant. 56 If an officer actually witnessed a crime occur, he was 
50. CUDDIHY, supra note 7, at 555 (outside Massachusetts and New Hampshire, 
"general warrants for stolen objects remained in use despite the opposition of legal 
authors."). 
51 . /d. at 575 (''Until the 1760s . .. colonial law had neither rejected general warrants 
nor embraced specific ones."). 
52. /d. at 754, 757. A warrant issued after Independence illustrates the practice well. 
The constable was instructed: "You are commanded forthwith to search all suspected places 
and persons that the complainant thinks proper, to find his lost pork, and to cause the same, 
and the person with whom it shall be found, or suspected to have taken the same, and have 
him appear before some proper authority, to be examined according to law." Frisbee v. 
Butler, 1 Kirby213, 213- 14 (Conn. 1787). 
53 . See discussion infra notes 64-74 and accompanying text. 
54. See Beattie, supra note 1 (observing that "there were severe limits as to the help 
victims of crime could expect to receive from [constables]."); Thomas Y. Davies, Farther 
and Farther from the Original Fifth Amendment: The Recharacterization of the Right 
Against Self-incrimination as a "Trial Right" in Chavez v. Martinez, 70 TENN. L. REv. 987, 
I 004 (2003) ("The constable had neither a duty nor the authority to investigate the 
possibility of uncharged crimes; in fact, in the absence of a warrant, the constable had little 
more arrest authority than any other person."); JAMES F. RJCHARDSON, THE NEw YoRK 
PoucE: COLONIAL nMES TO 1901 17-18 (1970) (describing similar powers by New York 
constables in early nineteenth century); H .B . Simpson, The Office of Constable, I 0 ENG. 
HIST. REv. 625, 635-36 (1895) (distinguishing the role of modem police from constables 
who were "regarded merely as ... police officer[s) attendant on the justices [of the peace] 
and other ministers of the crown."). For a description of the weakness of constables before 
the colonial era, see Joan Kent, The English Village Constable, 1580-1642: The Nature and 
Dilemmas of the Office, 20 J. BRIT. STUD. 26 (1981). 
55. See Davies, supra note 5, at 554 ("At common law, controlling the warrant did 
control the officer for all practical purposes."). 
56. Customs officers were permitted to search ships without warrants, but this 
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not liable if the person he arrested was not the culprit. Finally, an officer 
was immune from liability if he arrested an innocent person but a crime had 
in fact occurred and the officer had probable cause to believe the person he 
arrested had committed it. These bases for arrest also necessarily depended 
on a victim in most cases. Unless the officer witnessed the crime occur, he 
would seldom have a sufficient basis for concluding-at the risk of civil 
judgment-that a crime had in fact occurred. The part-time, often volunteer 
officers of the Framing Era, with little incentive to patrol, would have 
seldom discovered a crime in progress. 57 
Greater arrest powers in the early 1800s served only to bolster the 
importance of victims. Beginning in the early nineteenth century, an officer 
was not liable for false arrest if a citizen complained of a crime and 
identified the suspect for the officer to arrest. 58 
The lack of trust eighteenth-century society was willing to place in 
officers- and the lack of financial investment it was willing to make in 
police organizations-Qften left those least able to vindicate their rights 
solely responsible for doing so. By contrast, victims at the turn of the 
nineteenth century, who did not always know who had perpetrated the 
crimes against them, could have been aided by constables in the 
investigation. There was, however, no incentive for the constables to assist, 
because investigation was not regarded as part of their job. Wealthy victims 
could offer rewards, which obviously changed the incentives for officers, 
essentially rendering them private investigators.59 In all other cases, the 
warrantless search authority did not extend to constables seeking evidence of crimes. /d. at 
571. At common law, officers were immune from liability for false arrest if they witnessed 
the crime occur, responded to a "hue and cry," had a warrant for the arrest, or had probable 
cause to believe the arrestee had committed a felony when a crime had in fact occurred. See 
Horace L. Wilgus, Arrest Without a Warrant, 22 MICH. L. REv. 798, 809 (1923- 24). 
Officers were also permitted to arrest suspects for misdemeanors that were committed in 
their presence./d at 814. 
57. See Wesley MacNeil Oliver, The Neglected History of Criminal Procedure, 1850-
1.940, 62 RUTGERS L. REv. 447, 451-452 (2010) (describing institutional incentives of 
Framing-Era officers). 
58. See Davies, supra note 5, at 635-36. See generally Wilgus, supra note 56 
(describing English and American arrest rules). 
59. In the early years of the American republic, rewards were typically given by 
private parties seeking the return of their property See City Bank v. Bangs, 2 Edw. Ch. 95 
(1833) (discussing circumstances under which officer was entitled to receive private 
reward); BURROWS & WALLACE, supra note 4, at 637; ROGER LANE, POUCJNG THE CITY: 
BOSTON, 1822- 1885 56 (1967); RICHARDSON, supra note 54, at 62-63. In England beginning 
in the 1730s, the government offered rewards for the identification and successful 
prosecution of those committing more serious property crimes. See GERALD HowsoN, THIEF-
TAKER GENERAL: THE RISE AND FALL OF JORDAN WILD (1970); JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE 
ADVERSARY ORIGINS OF CRIMINAL TRIAL 109 {2003); Ruth Paley, Thief-takers in London in 
the Age of the McDaniel Gang c. 1745-1754, in DoUGLAS HAY & FRANCIS SNYDER (ED.), 
POUCING AND PROSECUTION IN BRITAIN 1750-1850 (1989). 
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public apparatus of the criminal justice system assisted the victim only after 
he made his complaint. The constable aided the victim in conducting any 
search and the magistrate interrogated the suspect, but any legwork, either 
prior to the allegation or trial, was left up to the victim. 60 
There were a couple of exceptions to this system of victim-driven 
investigations, neither of which involved conferring discretion on the 
constabulary. Customs and revenue violations, discussed below, could not 
have been investigated by victims because there were no victims.61 
Murders, for an entirely different reason, had to be investigated by someone 
other than the victim. Coroners, who were not required to have any medical 
training, assembled a jury that functioned much like modern grand juries.62 
These were private citizens who subpoenaed witnesses and considered any 
physical evidence, such as the crime scene and the body itself.63 There were 
no public-employed criminal investigators until mid-nineteenth-century 
refonns created modem police officers, who would reluctantly be given the 
prerogatives of customs officers. 
The Framing-Era and early American criminal justice systems did not 
involve investigations by public officers. Probable cause as it is understood 
in modem times would have allowed officers to act on the information they 
learned--or at least to seek judicial authorization to act on the information 
they learned. The eighteenth-century criminal justice system-driven by the 
investigations of private complainants-had no need for such a standard. A 
standard that allowed searches and seizure on the basis of an officer's 
investigation was, however, essential to customs and revenue enforcement 
in this era. 
60. See United States v. Dickerson, 530 U.S. 428, 435 n.l (2000) (observing that 
"custodial police interrogation is relatively recent because the routine practice of such 
interrogation is itself a relatively new development"); A1schuler, supra note 44. 
61. See Thomas Y. Davies, Correcting Search-and-Seizure History: Now-Forgotten 
Common-Law Warrantless Arrest Standards and the Original Understanding of "Due 
Process of Law", 77 Miss. L.J. 1, 118 {2007) (observing that John Adams, the primary 
drafter of the Massachusetts Constitution, doubtlessly recognized that the Virginia 
Constitution's requirements for a search warrant could not be satisfied for customs searches 
as no victim could swear that a crime had occurred). 
62. See I JOSEPH CHIITV, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE CRIMlNAL LAW 158-59 
(London, A.J. Valpy 1816) (observing unique method of investigation for murders); Juuus 
GoEBEL, JR., CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 59 
(1946) (describing process of murder investigation); JoHN lMPEY, THE OFFICE OF SHERIFF, 
SHEWING ITS HISTORY AND ANTIQUITY 440-41 (London, W. Clark and Sons 4th ed. 1817) 
(discussing duties of the coroner); George C. Thomas, lll, Colonial Criminal Law and 
Procedure: The Royal Colony of New Jersey 1749-1757, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 671, 
679-80 (2005) (describing a proceeding under coroner's inquest). 
63. For a history of the coroner's jury, see Thomas A. Green, The Jury and the English 
Law of Homicide, 1200-1600, 74 MICH. L. REv. 413, 422-25 (1976); Irvin L. Langbein, The 
Jury of Presentment and Coroner, 33 COLUM. L. REv. 1329 (1933). 
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B. Customs Investigations 
In contrast with ordinary law enforcement officers, customs officers 
had considerable discretion to initiate investigations and substantial 
financial incentives to do so. Even though the authority exercised by 
customs officers had been a major source of contention between Great 
Britain and the American colonies, customs and revenue officers continued 
to possess a unique type of discretion for decades after independence.64 
Customs officials were the only officers capable of seeking warrants~r 
engaging in warrantless searches or seizures~n the strength of facts they 
learned through their investigations.65 Probable cause, as understood in the 
modem world, was a standard uniquely applicable to customs officers. The 
method of compensating customs officers, however, gave them 
considerably more incentive to search than modem police officers possess. 
They received a portion of the government's fee or forfeiture for a 
violation.66 
As there was no victim to swear that a violation had occurred, the limits 
imposed on searches and seizures in ordinary criminal cases would have 
completely prevented the enforcement of customs and revenue laws if 
extended in those contexts. Eighteenth-century Americans' historical 
64. See Davies, supra note 28, at 60~8 (observing that Framers did not intend 
Fourth Amendment to create the same search and seizure standard for customs officers and 
officers who enforced ordinary criminal laws). 
65. The broad authority of eighteenth-century customs officers has been frequently 
recognized. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 151 (1925) (describing authority of 
late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century customs officers to search vessels without a 
warrant; Fabio Arcila, Jr., The Framer 's Search Power: The Misunderstood Statutory 
History of Suspicion & Probable Cause, 50 B.C. L. REv. 363, 363, 410 (2009) {observing 
that early Congresses gave customs officers considerable immunity from suit); Richard H. 
Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 
104 HARV. L. REv. 1731, 1783 n.279 (1991) (describing Marshall Court cases providing 
customs officers immunity from suit for seizing goods without warrant even when there was 
no good faith basis for officers' suspicion of illegal conduct); Alfred S. Martin, The King 's 
Customs: Philadelphia, 1763-1774, 5 WM. & MARY Q. 201 (1948) (describing the roles of 
customs officers in the Port of Philadelphia and the specific job performed by one officer 
whom the author regarded to be particularly honest and efficient); see also A.mar, supra note 
42, at 766 (describing authority of customs officers under late eighteenth-century statutes to 
search vessels without a warrant and suggesting that a warrant may not have been required 
under language of early customs laws to search homes, buildings, or stores). But see Tracey 
Maclin, The Complexity of the Fourth Amendment, 77 B.U. L. REv. 925, 952-53 {1997) 
(disputing Amar's claim). See generally THOMAS C. BARROW, 1'RADE AND EMPIRE: THE 
BRITISH CUSTOMS SERVICE IN COLONIAL AMERICA 166o-1775 (1967). 
66. See Davies, supra note 5, at 659; see also Eric Blumenson & Eva Nilsen, Policing 
for Profit: The Drug War's Hidden Economic Agenda, 65 U. CHI. L. REv. 35 (1998) 
(describing modem issues with allowing police departments to retain a portion of forfeited 
funds). 
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concerns about the discretion of customs officers may, however, make the 
amount of discretion uniquely vested in these officers seem surprising. 
General warrants empowering customs officers to search anywhere 
they suspected they would discover violations of import and tax laws 
particularly drew the ire of colonists. The first, and certainly most famous, 
of these controversies occurred in Massachusetts after the Superior Court 
issued customs officers a particular version of general warrants, known as 
writs of assistance, to discover evidence of illegal trading with French 
Canada. 67 When the warrants expired upon the death of King George II in 
1760, Boston area merchants and smugglers (groups with largely 
overlapping memberships) retained two of the best lawyers in 
Massachusetts, Joseph R. Frese and James Otis, to argue against reissuing 
them.68 Otis' now-famous argument objected that these warrants placed the 
liberty of every man in the "hands of a petty officer.'.69 John Adams, then a 
young lawyer, was in the audience and later said of the argument against 
this sort of authority' for customs officers, "Then and there was the child 
Independence bom."70 
The threat uniquely posed by customs officers brought about this 
intense criticism. The general warrant was not new to colonists in 1760. 
Constables had been issued general warrants throughout the colonial era to 
arrest unnamed persons or search unidentified places. While specific 
warrants, identifying the place to be searched or person to be seized, had 
come to replace general warrants in Massachusetts (though not in other 
colonies) well before Otis made this argument, this transition had been 
gradual and had not been provoked by any particular outrage.71 By contrast 
with the Americans, the English had long had philosophical objections to 
general warrants. Treatise writers had regarded them to be illegal for over a 
67. See John M. Burkoff, ''A Flame of Fire": The Fourth Amendment in Perilous 
Times, 74 MISS. L.J. 631,634-35 (2004). 
68. Writs of Assistance conferred their extraordinary discretion on the officers to 
whom they were issued for the life of the sovereign in whose name they were issued. To be 
precise, they expired six months after, in this case, the death of King George II. See NELSON 
B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED 
STATES CONSTITUTION 57 (1970). The reputation of Boston's most prominent eighteenth-
century merchants as smugglers bas been well confinned. See JOHN W. TYLER, SMUGGLERS 
AND PATRIOTS: BOSTON MERCHANTS AND THE ADVENT OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 
(1986). But see O.M. Dickerson, John Hancock: Notorious Smuggler or Near Victim of 
British Revenue Racketeers?, 32 Miss. VALLEY HIST. REv. 517 (1946). 
69. Otis' argument was recorded by a young John Adams who sat in the audience with 
a number of luminaries of the Boston legal, political, and conunercial world. LASSON, supra 
note 68, at 58- 59. Adams would later say of Otis' argument, "there the child of 
Independence was born." T. H. Breen, Subjecthood and Citizenship: The Context of James 
Otis 's Radical Critique of John Locke, 71 NEW ENG. Q. 378, 378 (1998). 
70. M. Blane Michael, Reading the Fourth Amendment: Guidance from the Mischief 
that Gave It Birth, 85 N.Y.U. L. REv. 905, 909 (2010)(quoting John Adams). 
71. CUDDIHY, supra note 7, at 328- 29. 
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century, and Sergeant William Hawkins's treatise in 1721 had specifically 
objected to general warrants empowering "a common Officer to arrest what 
Persons, and search what Houses he thinks fit."72 Americans did not object 
to the use of general warrants until they were placed in the hands of 
customs officers.73 
The writs of assistance added insult to injury by permitting customs 
officers to demand the assistance of citizens in conducting searches. 74 The 
right to call on the citizenry for assistance in the enforcement was not 
unique to the writs of assistance, but it prompted a public outrage in this 
context. If a constable was outmatched by the strength of either the offender 
he was to apprehend or the homeowner he was to search, he could call for a 
posse to assist him. 75 There were penalties for able-bodied men refusing to 
assist law enforcement officers, but typically members of the community 
very willingly came to the constable's aid.76 Alexis de Tocqueville 
observed the eagerness of Americans to join in the hunt for an accused.77 
However, constables were enforcing laws that generally met with the 
approval of the public. By contrast, colonial customs agents, at least those 
working for the British Crown, were enforcing laws that were anything but 
popular and, when armed with Writs of Assistance, were able to demand 
that the public become complicitous in their offensive enforcement. 
The abolition of general warrants did not, however, define the scope of 
authority for customs and revenue investigators, whose investigations were 
essential in a world prior to an income tax. It was, however, clear that 
general warrants were unlawful in early American Republic. American and 
English law had thoroughly repudiated general warrants by the time the 
colonies had separated from Great Britain but without a controversy in the 
colonies outside the customs context. The death knell for these warrants 
may well have been sounded in a case involving something other than 
72. Davies, supra note 5, at 579, 629. 
73. See discussion supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
74. See William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins ofCriminal Procedure, 105 YALE 
L.J. 393, 405 (2002). 
75. See Steven J. Heyman, Foundation of the Duty to Rescue, 47 V AND. L. REv. 673, 
689 (1994) (attributing the end of the requirement to assist police to the creation of 
nineteenth-century police departments charged with preventing crime). 
76. See WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN 
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 57 (1996); Gautham Rao, The Federal Posse Comitatus 
Doctrine: Slavery, Compulsion, and Statecraft in Mid-Nineteenth-Century America, 26 LAW 
& HJST. REv. l , 3 (2008) (observing that typically "[s]tates and localities exercised this 
power over persons with little apparent difficulty."). The meager state of law enforcement 
left a sort of citizen's veto in place. See LARRY D. KRAMER, 1HE PEOPLE 1HEMSELVES: 
POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 26 (2004) (describing the necessity of 
citizen cooperation with a posse and the possibility of citizen interference with attempts to 
arrest). 
77. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 95-96 (Perennial Classics 
2000). 
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customs enforcement, but this occurred in England, not the colonies. In the 
1760s, an outlandish pamphleteer, who made a career out of maligning the 
king' s ministers, waged a spectacular legal battle against general warrants.78 
General warrants were issued for the seizure of any papers revealing the 
authorship of North Briton Number 45, one installment of John Wilkes' 
weekly publication attacking King George III. 79 The warrants also called 
for the arrest of any persons suspected of authoring or publishing Number 
45.80 In a variety of suits filed by those, including Wilkes, who had been 
arrested or had their homes searched, the English courts provided precedent 
for the proposition, long espoused in the treatises, that general warrants 
were unlawful.81 Following the Wilkes cases, colonial courts refused to 
issue general warrants to customs officers even thoug4 Parliament 
specifically authorized these warrants in the Townshend Acts.82 The Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution would then permanently 
memorialize this rejection of general warrants. 
While the Framers were in accord in rejecting general warrants, they 
appear to have been of mixed minds about the sort of discretion customs 
officers should possess.83 The broader principle comprehended by a ban on 
general warrants is still debated in Fourth Amendment cases today. 84 Early 
federal legislation imposed varying requirements on these officers seeking 
search warrants. The First Congress, admittedly prior to the adoption of the 
Fourth Amendment, authorized magistrates to issue warrants permitting 
customs agents to search any specific building the officer alleged contained 
78. See ARTHUR H. CASH, JOHN WILKES: T HE SCANDALOUS FATHER OF C IVIL LIBERTY 
65- 95 (2006). 
79. ld. ·at 99-100; Cunonrv, supra note 7, at 440-41 . 
80. CUDDIHY, supra note 7, at 440-41. 
81. ld. at 444-46. 
82. See Davies, supra note 5, at 702. 
83. Davies, supra note 28, at 371 ("There is no indication in the historical record that 
the language of the Fourth Amendment was understood to alter the settled common-law 
standards for criminal arrest or search warrants."). 
84. There is no shortage of efforts to analogize the discretion given to modem police 
to the discretion given customs officers under general warrants. See, e.g. , Jed Rubenfeld, The 
End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REv. 101, 132--60 (2008) (analogizing the problem with general 
warrants to use of undercover agents, detention of enemy combatants, and wiretapping); 
Barbara Salken, The General Warrant of the Twentieth Century? A Fourth Amendment 
Solution to Unchecked Discretion to Arrest for Traffic Offenses, 62 TEMP. L. REv. 221 
(1989); Scott E. Sunby, Protecting the Citizen "Whilst He is Quiet": Suspicionless Searches, 
"Special Needs " and General Warrants, 74 Miss. L. J. 501 (2004) (arguing that intrusions 
lacking probable cause or a warrant justified under "special needs" exception is analogous to 
general warrant). In the late nineteenth century, analogies were similarly drawn to subpoenas 
for records of telegraphed communications. See, e.g., Ex Parte Brown, 72 Mo. 83 (Mo. 
1880). Andrew Taslitz has recently drawn an analogy between slave patrols in the 
antebellum South and general warrants. See ANDREW E. T ASLIT2, RECONSTRUCTING THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT: A HISTORY OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE, 1789-1868 12 (2006). 
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evidence of an import violation.85 The Third Congress, following 
ratification of the Fourth Amendment, adopted Alexander Hamilton's 
Excise Act, which required revenue officers to provide magistrates with 
facts demonstrating probable cause to believe evidence of a violation could 
be discovered in the place described.86 The First Congress's scheme did 
little to constrain the discretion of customs agents. It merely placed an 
administrative burden on them in the form of necessary paperwork. Much 
like victims in criminal cases, customs officers' allegations were sufficient 
for warrants. The Third Congress' scheme placed a genuine limitation on 
revenue agents. A disinterested magistrate had to agree with the (very) 
interested agent that probable cause existed. This latter scheme looked very 
much like the modem warrant standard under which a neutral and detached 
decision maker evaluates the basis of the officer's suspicions. 
Under either scheme, customs and revenue officers had discretion that 
far eclipsed that of ordinary law enforcement officers. The mechanism for 
obtaining a warrant tells only part of the story. Much like in modem times, 
warrants were not always required. Each of these Congressional schemes 
also allowed officers to engage in warrantless seizures--customs agents 
could search ships without a warrant and revenue officers could search 
registered distillers without suspicion.87 Beyond that, Congressional 
legislation and Marshall Court opinions made suits against customs officers 
for trespass extraordinarily difficult to win. 88 
Ironically, Americans, who had just fought a war of independence in 
large part over customs enforcement, conferred remarkably more authority 
on customs and revenue officers than they would contemplate giving 
officers enforcing criminal laws. Probable cause, as we understand it in 
modem terms, was sufficient for these searches, in some cases more than 
sufficient. Customs officers were permitted to seek authorization for 
searches and seizures on the basis of their investigations, or sometimes act 
on their own as a result of their investigations. They were financially 
rewarded when their suspicions were correct. Neither financial incentives 
nor legal standards equipped officers enforcing criminal laws with such 
motivation or discretion. The realities of urban life--and new types of 
criminal laws- would confer similar legal powers on police officers. 
85. See CUDDIHY, supra note 7, at 757 (2009) (observing that under the Federal 
Collections Act of 1789, magistrates were given no discretion to refuse a customs officer's 
request for a warrant). 
86. /d. at 757 (observing that Alexander Hamilton's Excise Act of 1791 required 
"reasonable cause of suspicion to be made out to the satisfaction of ... [a] judge or 
justice."). 
87. Amar, supra note 42, at 766; Cloud, supra note 14, at 1743 n.l27. 
88. See Arcila, supra note 65, at 420-21 (describing bow early American customs 
statutes operated to limit access to remedies for unreasonable searches); Fallon & Meltzer, 
supra note 65, at 1783 n.279. 
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II. NINETEENTII-CENTURY PROHIBITION FASHIONED POLICE-FRIENDLY 
SEARCH STANDARD 
As modem police departments were created, ordinary officers were 
given incentives-though not as overtly pecuniary as those given to 
customs officers-to investigate crime aggressively. With the development 
of full-time police forces, law enforcement became a career rather than a 
part-time obligation. Successful performance became a basis for retention 
and promotion. 89 Conferring power on these officers to conduct searches or 
make arrests on the basis of information discovered they discovered made 
sense, as their investigations were only useful if they could supplant, or at 
least supplement, victims' complaints. 
Good record keeping in New York City and the abundance of 
secondary materials on its history make the city a good starting point when 
examining nineteenth-century changes in criminal procedure. When the 
City of New York created a force of career officers to suppress riots and 
investigate and prevent crimes, it increased the amount of manpower 
dedicated to law enforcement, developed a military-style hierarchy, and 
perhaps even increased the social standing of those responsible for policing 
the City.90 The creation of the new force had changed the incentives for 
police officers. There were political motivations for those at the top of the 
hierarchy to at least appear to be suppressing crime, and those lower in the 
hierarchy had an interest either in climbing the ladder or simpl¥ retaining a 
better-than-average-paying job in the mid-nineteenth century. 1 The legal 
standards that had inhibited eighteenth-century constables did not, however, 
immediately change with the adoption of this new force. While the state 
legislature had authorized the force's creation a year earlier, it had done 
nothing to modify the search and seizure standards that had made police 
investigations legally irrelevant.92 Because of public hostility to police 
departments, the legislature's abstinence on this issue is hardly surprising. 
Indeed, the creation of professional police departments had been thwarted 
89. See Oliver, supra note 57 at 459-60 (describing rise of career officers). 
90. See LISA KELLER, TRiuMPH OF ORDER: DEMOCRACY & PUBLIC SPACE IN NEW YORK 
AND LoNDON 163 (2009); Davies, supra note 5, at 641. The new rules for the New York 
Municipal Police made it clear that officers were to be more proactive than their predecessor 
constables and watchmen. CITY OF NEW YORK, RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE GENERAL 
GOVERNMENT OF THE POLICE DEPARTMENT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 25 (1848) [hereinafter 
NEW YoRK, RULES AND REGULATIONS] (stating that the "prevention of crime [is] the most 
important object" of the officer). Certainly the social standing of higher-ranking police 
officers in the early twentieth century exceeded that of any law enforcement offic.er in the 
eighteenth century. For example, Police Commissioners Teddy Roosevelt and Arthur Woods 
were both Harvard graduates and were definitely in the upper echelon ofNew York society. 
9 I. See Oliver, supra note 57, at 459-60. 
92. See RICHARDSON, supra note 54, at 51. 
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for nearly a decade by concerns about maintaining a military-style force 
with broad police powers.93 
For nearly a decade after the creation of the Municipal Police Force, the 
law did not permit an officer to apply for a search warrant; crime victims 
alone retained this prerogative. The needs of law enforcement may have 
been a contributing factor to the willingness of New Yorkers to accept 
police-initiated searches, but the timing of the new standard demonstrates 
that another factor was far more substantial. Victimless crimes-to the 
extent they existed in the mid-nineteenth century-were neither regularly 
investigated nor prosecuted. It would take the Temperance Movement to 
whip up support for a new search procedure. 
As the Temperance Movement shifted from moral suasion to successful 
advocacy of legislation in the mid-nineteenth century, it needed a 
mechanism to ensure compliance with state-wide prohibitory laws.94 With a 
few rare exceptions in the mid-nineteenth century, searches outside the 
customs context could occur only if someone could swear that a crime had 
actually occurred.95 The advocates of Prohibition did not seek an 
opportunity to conduct a search for an obscure crime that was rarely 
prosecuted. They sought a mechanism to search for the most commonly 
committed "crime" of their era, a mechanism that would have to be capable 
of frequent exercise if Prohibition were to have a chance of success. The 
drafters- and certainly the opponents-{)[ this new law recognized that 
they were reshaping the rules relating to searches in ordinary criminal 
cases.96 And in response to this new power, courts crafted a new 
mechanism for limiting police officers: the exclusionary rule, which would 
quickly be cabined to searches for liquor that lacked the requisite 
formalities. 
Prohibition introduced New York, and many other states, to a warrant 
application process in ordinary criminal cases that did not require a victim's 
complaint. For as much as New York City owned the nineteenth century 
93. See BURROWS & WALLACE, supra note 4 at 636-38. See generally William S. 
Fields & David T. Hardy, The Third Amendment and the Issue of Maintenance of Standing 
Armies: A Legal History, 35 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 393 (1991). 
94. JOHN A. KRoUT, THE ORIGINS OF PROHIBITION 266 (1925); LoRI D. GINZBERG, 
WOMEN IN THE WORK OF BENEVOLENCE: MORALITY, POUTICS, AND CLASS IN THE 
NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES 98-132 (1990); Jed Dannenbaum, The Origins of 
Temperance Activism and Militancy Among American Women, 15 J. Soc. Hist. 235, 239-40 
(1981) (explaining the Temperance Movement's shift from moral suasion to prohibition in 
terms of gender). 
95. See supra discussion note 56 and accompanying text. 
96. Efforts at liquor enforcement obviously required enhanced investigatory powers, 
which benefited the advocates of greater police authority. The relationship between 
Prohibitionists and advocates of stronger police powers was strained, however, as even the 
fledging policing organizations of the first half of the nineteenth century bad recognized the 
perils of enforcing limits on alcohol. See ROBERT L. HAMPEL, TEMPERANCE AND PROHIBITION 
lN MAsSACHUSETIS, 1813- 1852 (1982). 
2011] THE MODERN HISTORY OF PROBABLE CAUSE 401 
(just as Boston and Philadelphia had owned the eighteenth century), the 
nineteenth-ceo~ Prohibition movement did not have its origins anywhere 
near Manhattan.9 Its origins lie in a much smaller town whose historical 
significance is often underappreciated: Portland, Maine. Of course, Portland 
does seem an unlikely location to have spawned a national social reform or 
legal change. Maine was then, as it is now, a relatively unpopulated state, 
with most of its citizens residing in southern coastal towns. Portland itself 
was a mid-sized port, comparable to New Haven, Salem, and Charleston. 
Its status as an import and export hub was a blessing and a curse to the town 
of 20,000 in the antebellum era.98 While, trade benefited the city, drunken 
sailors created a market for the ready flow of cheap rum. However, alcohol 
use in this town was not unique to transient sailors; over 300 bars and 
taverns ~erated within the city limits, some serving alcohol out of open 
troughs. Minors as well as adults were intoxicated on Portland's streets at 
all hours of the day and night.100 
It was not the character of the town, but rather the determination and 
single-minded devotion of one of its residents, that made Portland the home 
of the American Prohibition movement. Neal Dow was a Quaker far less 
passive than one might imagine for a man of that religious sect. He owned a 
tannery he had inherited from his father, was a leader in his local fire 
department, and had a reputation for being a firebrand orator prone to 
97. Philadelphia had, of course, been the revolutionary capital and became the nation's 
financial capital in the eighteenth century, a status it maintained well into the nineteenth 
century. ROBERT E. WRIGHT, THE FIRST WALL STREET: CHESTNUT STREET, PHlLADELPHIA, 
AND THE BIRTH OF AMERICAN FINANCE 11 (2005). Boston began the eighteenth century as 
America's premier city. See EVARTS BOUTELL GREENE, PROVINCIAL AMERICA, 1690-1740, 
in THE AMERICAN NATION: A HISTORY 244 (Albert Busbwell Hart ed., Classic· Reprints 
1964) (1905) ("during the first half of the eighteenth century Boston held its place as the 
most considerable centre of population and trade on the continent."). Both Philadelphia and 
New York had larger populations than Boston by outbreak of the American Revolution, but 
Boston had a political significance that neither of the larger cities could rival. The oft-held 
perception ofNew York as America' s most important city did not emerge until the second 
half on the nineteenth century. See ROBERT A.M. STERN, THOMAS MELLINS & DAVID 
FISHMAN, NEW YORK 1880: ARCHITECTURE AND URBANISM IN THE GUILDED AGE 15 (1999) 
("In the eyes of the so-called civilized world, and especially those in major European 
capitals, post-Civil War New York was only just beginning to come into focus as America's 
representative city."); DAVID McCULLOUGH, GREAT BRIDGE: THE EPIC STORY OF THE 
BUILDING OF THE BROOKLYN BRIDGE 121 (1972) (New York "was the undisputed center of 
the new America that had been emerging since the [civil] war."). 
98. CAMPBELL GIBSON, POPULATION 0IV1SION, U. S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 
POPULATION 0IV1SION WORKING PAPER NO. 27, 1998, POPULATION OF THE 100 LARGEST 
CITIES AND OrnER URBAN PLACES IN THE UNITED STATES: 1790 TO 1990, Table B, available 
at http://www.census.gov/populationlwww/documentationltwps0027/twps0027.html (last 
visited Apr. 2, 2011). 
99. NEAL Dow, THE REMINISCENCES OF NEAL Dow: RECOLLECTIONS OF EIGHTY YEARS 
153-80 (1898). 
100. /d. at 169. 
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lobbing personal attacks against his opponents.101 Long a temperance 
advocate of powerful constitution, very early in his adult life he was heard 
to object to the excesses of alcohol use, particularly rum, in his city.102 
Inspired by a failed effort at statewide prohibition in Massachusetts in the 
1830s, he embarked on a tireless campaign to create a criminal penalty for 
the sale1 manufacture, or possession of alcoholic beverages in Maine in the 
184Qs.103 
In form, Dow's idea was unusual; in substance, it was revolutionary. 
There were few victimless crimes on the books in the first half of the 
nineteenth century, and those that did exist were rarely enforced.104 Their 
enforcement was so infrequent that no one had given much thought to the 
mechanism used to obtain a warrant to search for pornography, for 
instance.105 Dow had not, however, proposed creating a run-of-the-mill 
victimless crime: he had targeted alcohol. Since the colonial era, local 
licensing laws had regulated alcohol, which ensured lenient liquor laws in 
towns in which demand for alcohol was high. 106 Port cities and rural 
101. See FRANKL. BYRNE, PROPHET OF PROIDBITION: NEAL Dow AND HIS CRUSADE 9-
16 (1961). 
102. !d. at 12- 24. 
103. Id at 24. General James Appleton made the attempt in Massachusetts, and his 
family would insist that he had not received his due for the later success in Maine. See D. F. 
APPLETON, THE ORIGIN OF THE MAINE LAW AND OF PROIDBITORY LEGISLATION, WITH A BRIEF 
MEMOIR OF JAMES APPLETON ( 1886). 
104. At the tum of the nineteenth century, American authorities recognized the 
legitimacy of search warrants only to recover stolen goods. See OLIVER L. BARBOUR, A 
TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW AND CRIMINAL COURTS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 499 
(2d ed. 1852)~ In re Special Investigations No. 228,458 A.2d 820, 831 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
1983) ("the common law of England and of Maryland recognized the search warrant for 
stolen goods, but no other search warrant."); Amar, supra note 42 at 765 (describing that 
"common law search warrants .. . were solely for stolen goods."). But see A. OAKEY HALL, 
A REVIEW OF THE WEBSTER CASE BY A MEMBER OF TilE NEW-YORK BAR (New York, J.S. 
Redfield 1850) (rare case in which a search warrant was authorized without statutory 
authority for the search of a home for clothes which a witness claimed the culprit wore). 
Some early American statutes permitted searches for smuggled items or dangerous items 
such as gunpowder or diseased or infected items. !d. Treatise writer Joel Bishop recognized 
in 1880 that search warrants were most commonly issued for stolen goods although warrants 
to discover lottery tickets, intoxicating liquors, and gaming implements were beginning to be 
issued as new statutes created victimless crimes. 1 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE; OR, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF PLEADING AND EVIDENCE AND THE 
PRACfiCE IN CRIMINAL CASES 145 (3d ed. 1880). 
105. See ME. REv. STAT. tit. XII, Ch. 160, § 19 (1841). Even though state statutes in 
Maine authorized a search for pornography, for instance, Governor Dana observed in 1850 
that the only victimless crime investigated using a search warrant was unlawful possession 
of gunpowder. There were very rare exceptions. I 3 THE MONTHLY LAw REPoRTER 208-09 
(Stephen H. Phillips, ed., Boston, Charles C. Little & James Brown 1851) [hereinafter 
MONTHLY LAW}. 
106. See generally KROUT, supra note 94 (tracing history of prohibition from colonial 
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villages under the new law would be treated alike; neither would be allowed 
to permit any sales of alcohol. This was an attempt at a social revolution 
through the criminal justice system. For somewhat obvious reasons, 
prohibition would become the most prosecuted victimless crime of the 
nineteenth century.107 
· Maine adopted Dow's first prohibitory bill in 1846, which was largely 
ineffective. Because it did noting to authorize searches for liquor, the law 
failed to put a meaningful dent in the amount of alcohol in the state, even 
by its proponents' estimates.108 Witnesses alleging violations of liquor 
laws-often informants paid by Temperance Men-would testify to 
observing sales, but were seldom believed.109 Prosecutions frequently 
suffered from a lack of physical evidence, as existing search and seizure 
doctrines did not permit searches for illegal alcohol.110 There were no 
victims who could complain of an injury from a violation of the liquor law. 
Dow would therefore return to the legislature in 1849 with a proposal to 
permit a search for evidence of this victimless crime. 111 Under the bill, any 
three persons could appear before a magistrate, allege that they had 
probable cause to believe liquor was in the location specified in the 
complaint, and obtain a warrant.112 This was, of course, essentially the 
procedure in Maine, as in all early American states, for obtaining a search 
warrant to recover stolen goods. 113 There were some differences in the 
requirements for a search warrant, depending on whether an applicant 
wanted to search for alcohol or stolen goods. Dow's proposal required three 
complainants, while a search warrant for stolen goods could be obtained by 
era to enactment of Maine Law). 
107. One piece of data confirming this conclusion can be found in a late nineteenth-
century digest. The search and seizure entry refers the reader to the section on intoxicating 
liquors. ALBERT R. SAVAGE, AN INDEX-DIGEST OF THE REPORTS OF CASES DECIDED BY TilE 
SUPREME JUDiCIAL COURT OF MAINE (1897). There were victimless crimes in the mid-
nineteenth century, all of which depended on searches and seizures for prosecution. See, e.g., 
BENJAMIN KINGSBURY, JR., THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE: DESIGNED TO BE A GUIDE TO JUSTICES 
OF THE PEACE, FOR THE STATE OF MAINE 180 (Portland, Sanborn & Carter 1852) (describing 
types of items that could be sought under search warrant); ME. REv. STAT. tit. III, ch. 34, § 5 
( 1841) (permitting searches for improperly stored gunpowder); id. tit. XII, ch. 160, § 18 
(allowing search warrant to discover young women in bawdy houses); id. § 20 (permitting 
warrants for obscene publications). Yet the digest entry for search and seizure notes that all 
of the cases decided in Maine on this topic have been considered in the context of 
intoxicating liquors. 
108. Neal Dow himself recognized that without the search mechanism, his efforts 
would have been doomed to failure. See generally Prohibitory Laws of Maine, N.Y. TIMEs, 
Feb. 3, 1896, at 5. 
109. BYRNE, supra note 101, at 39. 
ll 0. !d. at 42. 
Ill . ld. at 42-43. 
112. The New Liquor Law, KENNEBEC JOURNAL, Aug. 23, 1849, at 3. 
113. See notes 9- 12 and accompanying text. 
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only one complainant. A complainant alJeging stolen goods had to be a 
victim of the crime, while there were obviously no victims of the 
prohibitory laws. Each type of warrant, however, required only the 
complainant's allegation of his suspicions. Applicants for search warrants 
under Dow's proposal, just as applicants for search warrants to recover 
stolen goods, were not required to explain the basis of their suspicion. 
Both houses of the legislature passed Dow's bill, but not 
enthusiastically. Searches for alcohol threatened a new degree of 
government intrusion. While a search for a stolen item could be initiated 
only if a victim identified missing property, presumably located only in a 
single location, a complainant could contend that liquor was housed in any 
number of locations. There was also concern about the character of 
applicants who would seek warrants for illegal liquor, for the same 
witnesses Dow and others had hired to bear witness against their neighbors 
under the old law were expected to appear as complainants under this new 
law.ll4 
Many members of the legislature voted against the measure. However, 
others, opposed prohibition entirely or feared expanding the government's 
authority to search, voted for the bill because they were from pro-
temperance districts. Legislators appear to have struck a deal with the 
outgoing Governor John Dana to veto the bill if it passed. 115 
When the legislature passed the bill, Governor Dana issued a 
preliminary statement summarily expressing his concern about the search 
and seizure provision. 116 Months later, he would issue a remarkably 
thorough veto message to the legislature.117 Near the end of his life, Neal 
Dow paid this document a strong compliment, writing in his memoirs that 
"[f]rom that day to this nothing has been urged against Prohibition that was 
not expressed or implied in what Governor Dana had to say nearly half a 
century ago."118 It could certainly be argued that Dow, a man with no 
wavering belief in the righteousness of his cause, was noting the lack of 
arguments that could be made against his reform. Far more likely, he was 
paying a genuine compliment to the thoroughness of a deceased and 
respected adversary. Dow also noted in his memoirs that Dana was "a man 
114. See BYRNE, supra note 101, at 42 (observing Dow's difficulty in finding credible 
witnesses to liquor sales). 
115. This inference is supported by the fact that a similar development occurred with 
the passage of the liquor law of 1851, which was successful. Several members of the 
legjslature who voted for the bill counseled then-Governor John Hubbard to veto it, noting 
that they could not have voted for it and retained their seats. They advised him to follow the 
course of his predecessor. See Dow, supra note 99, at 340-43. Neal Dow also observed that 
Governor Dana had taken the "counsel of some of the leaders in his party" in vetoing the 
bill. ld. at 320. 
116. Closing Proceedings of the Legislature, KENNEBEC JOURNAL, Aug. 23, 1849, at 3. 
117. MONTHLY LAW, supra note 105, at 205-13. 
118. Dow, supra note 99, at 319. 
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of ability and influence, and justly entitled to leadership among his political 
associates. "119 
In the portion of the message dealing with the search provision, 
Governor Dana observed that common law protections against 
unreasonable searches were inapplicable to searches for evidence of this 
crime.120 He acknowledged that searches for other items could be initiated 
by a mere complaint, but observed that most frequently searches were to 
recover stolen goods. In order to initiate this most common search, 
there must be a pre-existing fact, not merely suspected, but known to the 
complainant, to wit, the loss of the goods; and when such a fact exists, the 
person suffering the loss, in instituting search, will give to it only that 
direction which the circumstances may indicate, as most likely to result in 
the recovery of his property.121 
With no victim to swear to an injury, and no specific goods to search 
for, Governor Dana contended that there was no limit on the number of 
searches that could be authorized and no end point to a search for liquor.122 
The governor recognized that the Maine Legislature had previously 
authorized searches for some victimless crimes--(;rimes for which no one 
could swear to an injury. Searches were permitted, for instance, for 
pomographyt 3 prostitutes, 124 gambling instruments, 125 and illegally stored 
gunpowder.' 6 Of these, only gunpowder searches were conducted with any 
degree of frequency, and this was likely due to the extraordinary number of 
gunpowder mills that had cropped up shortly before Maine's statehood. 127 
Governor Dana noted that, unlike in the case of alcohol searches, there was 
"no danger of general abuse" of the gunpowder warrant, as "the number is 
119. /d.at321. 
120. M ONTHLY LAW, supra note 105, at 208-09. 
121. !d. at 208. 
122. !d. at 208-09 
123. ME. REv. STAT., tit XU, ch. 160, § 20 (1841). 
124. !d.§ 18. 
125. /d. § 39. 
126. One of the earliest statutes of Maine provided that a search warrant could be 
obtained by a selectman of the town to investigate the possibility that gunpowder was being 
stored contrary to the regulations of the town. An Act for the Prevention of Damage by Fire, 
and the Safe Keeping of Gun Powder, ch. 25, § 5, 1821 Me. Laws 112,114 (1821); JoHN 
MAURICE O'BRIEN, THE POWERS AND D UTIES OF 11fE T OWN OFFICER, AS CONTAINED IN TilE 
STATUTES OF MAINE 261 (Hallowell, Glazier, Masters & Smith 4th ed. & Co. 1840). Statutes 
regulating the possession of gunpowder in early American states were somewhat common. 
See Saul Cornell & Nathan DeDino, A Well-Regulated Right: The Early American Origins of 
Gun Control, 73 FORDHAM L. REv. 487,510-12 {2004). 
127. See MAURICE M. WHITTEN, THE GUNPOWDER MfLLS OF MAINE 3 ( I 990) (indicating 
that around 1820, entrepreneurs in Maine sought to establish mills io the new state, where 
there had previously been none). 
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small to whom the suspicion could possibl~ attach, of violating the law, 
which regulates the keeping of gunpowder."' 8 
Governor Dana's message reveals something very interesting about the 
protections eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century criminal procedure 
provided against unreasonable searches and seizures. The common law 
limitations on warrants had ensured that searches would be relatively rare, 
not that they would necessarily be accurate. Neal Dow had proposed 
greatly enlarging the role of the state by authorizing searches of homes to 
discover evidence of a frequently violated law. Searches for alcohol under 
his new prohibitory law would not be rare. To get his bill enacted, Dow 
would have to convince the legislature and the governor that be had 
discovered a mechanism to enhance the accuracy of searches. 
A year after Governor Dana's veto, Neal Dow returned to the 
legislature with a bill that would not only be enacted in Maine, but would 
be adopted in several American jurisdictions. This bill, like Dow's previous 
bill, permitted magistrates to issue warrants to search for liquor when three 
voters alleged they had probable cause to believe alcohol could be located 
in the specified location. 129 The bill, however, forbade a search of a 
dwelling house unless one of the three complainants swore that he 
witnessed an alcohol sale out of the house.130 Like Dow's previous attempt, 
this bill passed both houses of the legislature, and Dana's successor, John 
Hubbard, signed it into law on June 2, 1851.131 This law would forever link 
the state with the prohibition movement, as around the world, 
prohibitionists would advocate adopting the "Maine Law."132 
The provisions of the new law obviously required a magistrate to 
review a complaint containing facts supporting the affiant's conclusion that 
a crime bad been committed. This was of course the process Hale, 
Hawkins, and Blackstone bad prescribed for all search warrants, but which 
128. MONTHLY LAw, supra note 105, at 208. Governor Dana's analysis here is not 
Wllike the justification for warrantless searches of closely regulated businesses. See 5 
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 37-95 
(4th ed. 2004). 
129. Voting requirements in Maine were not particularly stringent in the mid-nineteenth 
century. All males, including African Americans, who were neither aliens nor paupers, and 
who had established a residence in the state for at least three months, were entitled to vote. 
See Opinion of the Supreme Judicial Court, 44 Me. 507 (1857) (responding to question 
posed to the court by the state senate). 
130. An Act for the Suppression of Drinking Houses and Tippling Shops, 1851 Me. 
Laws 210, 214-15, Me. Rev. Stat ch. 211, § 11 (1851 ). 
131. !d. at215. 
132. See DocuMENTARY HISTORY OF THE MAINE LAW: COMPRISING THE ORIGINAL 
MAINE LAW, THE NEW-YORK PROHIBITORY LIQUOR LAW, LEGISLATIVE DEBATES, 
ARGUMENTS, JUDICIAL DECISIONS, STATISTICS, lMPORTANT CORRESPONDENCE; "INQUISITION" 
AND PROHIBITION VERSUS "FREEDOM" AND ANTI-PROHIBITION 85- 86 (New York, Hall & 
Brother 1855) [hereinafter DocUMENTARY HISTORY]. 
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was rarely, if ever, followed in practice.133 For many members of the 
legislature, this standard not only provided a mechanism to prevent false 
searches, it also may have seemed a comfortable resort to a procedure 
deeply rooted in Anglo-American history. The statute, that is, may have 
evoked a sense of nostalgia for a past that never existed. 
Neal Dow was widely (and falsely) credited as author of this new 
search provision, 134 which contemporaries recognized as fundamentally 
changing the law. Reformers, including Lyman Beecher, Horace Mann, and 
Sam Houston, bailed the passage of the new law .135 Attracting such national 
attention were Dow's tireless self-promotion and the only substantial 
change from Maine's 1846 statewide prohibitory law, the new enforcement 
mechanism specified in the act's warrant section. Fellow prohibitionist John 
Marsh dubbed Neal Dow the ''Napoleon of Temperance" and hailed the 
search and seizure provision for making prohibition a reality. Dow, Marsh 
wrote, had "brought into the battle-field every officer of the State, . . . 
turned its whole artillery against the rum-fortifications, and in less than six 
months, ... swept every distillery and brew-house, hotel-bar, splendid 
saloon and vile groggery clean from the State."136 
It would have been surprising if Dow had developed a standard that 
would have been so familiar to lawyers. Dow, a tanner by trade, never 
studied law, although it was his dream.137 His father had great disdain for 
lawyers and insisted that his son not attend college,. 138 In his memoirs, Neal 
Dow noted that he received some "technical" assistance in writing the 
Maine Law from Edward Fox, a prominent Portland lawyer who later 
would be appointed a federal district judge by Andrew Jobnson.139 
13 3. See sources cited supra note 21. 
134. See e.g. BYRNE, supra note 101, at 45 ("Dow's greatest innovation was the 
provision for search and seizure."); HENRYS. CLUBB, THE MAINE LIQUOR LAW: hs ORIGIN, 
HISTORY, AND RESULTS, INCLUDING A LIFE OF HON. NEAL Dow 23 (New York, Fowler & 
Wells 1856) ("Still persevering, Neal Dow again appeared in the Hall of Representatives in 
August, 1850, with a bill of his own drafting, subsequently known as the ' Maine Law."'); 
ALLAN LEVINSKY, A SHORT HISTORY OF PORTLAND 79 (2007). 
135. See BYRNE, supra note 101, at 49, 141. 
136. Jd. at 48. 
13 7. Though he had no legal training, Dow did once appear as counsel to defend a 
woman who was charged with horsewhipping a rum-shop keeper for selling liquor to her 
husband. The woman requested that Dow be permitted to act as her lawyer, and 
notwithstanding his lack of training in the law, the judge permitted him to do so. The jury 
found her guilty but recommended mercy, and she was required to pay, as Dow later 
recalled, "a slight fine" which he paid. Dow, supra note 99, at 99. 
138. See id. at 56-58; IX S.M. WATSON, THE MAINE HISTORJCAL AND GENEALOGICAL 
RECORDER 1884-1898 226 (1973). It was boasted in his father's obituary that he had only 
once resorted to the legal system in a suit to successfully recover a debt against the advice of 
his lawyer. Death Notice of Josiah Dow, Fox Family Scrapbooks, Vol. 3, Collection 849, 
Maine Historical Society (describing father's sole resort to the law). 
139. See Dow, supra note 99, at 334-35 ("Having completed [the bill} to my own 
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Fox's assistance was far more substantial than Dow would ever 
publicly acknowledge. A graduate of Harvard College and Harvard Law 
School, Fox was extremely well regarded as a scholarly and knowledgeable 
attorney. 140 He was, therefore, likely either already familiar with 
Blackstone's description of the process for seeking a search warrant or 
became familiar with this description. Even if be never handled a criminal 
case, he would have had ready access to a volume with this description of 
the warrant application process. One of the earliest American versions of 
Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England was published in 
Portland, and early Maine manuals for justices of the peace reiterated this 
description, which was, as a practical matter, never followed. 141 
Blackstone's Commentaries were a staple in the libr~ of mid-nineteenth-
century lawyers, and Fox was surely no exception.14 He was also much 
more likely than Dow to be familiar with the similar procedure required to 
obtain a warrant under the Excise Act of 1791. These facts alone would 
suggest that Fox was the more likely author of the new search and seizure 
provision. 
Open letters, published in Portland newspapers, between Neal Dow and 
his cousin, John Neal, confirm Fox's role in creating this provision. John, 
also a Portland lawyer, had initially been a supporter of his cousin's efforts 
to enact the Maine Law. However, a feud developed between the two, 
largely over a client of John's, a notorious Portland prostitute named 
Margaret Landigren, alias "Kitty Kentuck." She was convicted of violating 
the new liquor law-a charge John Neal believed to be false. 143 When John 
personally put up bond for her appeal, Neal Dow alleged that his cousin 
was having an affair, or at least a series of commercial transactions, with 
satisfaction, I submitted it to Edward Fox . . .. He suggested a few changes, principally on 
technical points, which I accepted."). 
140. For biograprucal information on Edward Fox, seeN. M. Fox, A HisTORY o F THAT 
PART OF THE Fox FAMILY DESCENDED FROM THOMAS FOX Of CAMBRIDGE, MASS. 47 (St. 
Joseph, Mo., Union Printing 1899); HERBERT T. SILSBY, Il, MEMORABLE JUSTICES AND 
LAWYERS OF MAINE 188- 91 (2006); WILLIAM WILLIS, A HISTORY OF THE LAW, TilE COURTS, 
AND THE LAWYERS OF MAINE, FROM ITS FIRST COLONIZATION TO THE EARLY PART OF TilE 
PRESENT CENTURY, at iv (Portland, Bailey & Noyes 1 863). 
141. See SIR WILLIAM. BLACKSTONE, KNT., COMMENT ARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 
(Portland, Thomas B. Wait 1807); JEREMIAH PERLEY, THE MAINE JUSTICE 75-76 (Hallowell, 
Goodale, Glazier 1823) (stating standard from Blackstone). I am grateful to Chris Livesay, 
who allowed me to spend a day going through these and other original nineteenth-century 
treatises he has collected in his Brunswick. Maine law office. 
142. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY Of AMERICAN LAW 463 n.l (3d ed. 
2005) (describing Lincoln's reliance on Blackstone); ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL 
EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850s TO THE 1980s 47-48 on.36-37 (1983) (observing 
that Blackstone's Commentaries provided the curriculum for early American law schools). 
143. See Matthew J. Baker, The Saga of Portland's Unsinkable, Irish Kitty Kentuck, 
PORTLAND MONTHLY MAGAZINE, Dec. 1996, at 24, 25-27; JAMES MUNDY, HARD TIMES, 
HARD MEN: MAINE AND THE IRISH 1830-1860 90-91 (1990). 
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Kitty. 144 Angry letters between the two contained a variety of allegations, 
one of which Neal Dow never refuted.145 John Neal alleged that his cousin 
was accepting accolades from all over the globe for drafting a search and 
seizure law everyone in the Portland community knew was drafted by 
Edward Fox.146 
This new standard was indeed groundbreaking and, for prohibitionists, 
certainly worthy of the praise it received even if the wrong person was 
lauded. Fox's work had produced a standard that required a very specific 
type of proof to authorize a search. This new standard, however, took a step 
toward the modem probable cause standard in expressly requiring 
consideration of the facts supporting a complainant's accusations. 
Prohibitionists turned to the legislature two years later to amend the 
statute they had successfully passed. It was a creative effort to permit liquor 
searches whenever three complainants swore that they had probable cause 
to believe alcohol could be discovered in ·the search requested and 
jettisoned the requirement that one of the complainants observe and testify 
to a liquor sale on the premises. Prohibitionists were attempting to install 
the original standard Neal Dow had proposed in 1849, which would have 
permitted a search whenever a complainant swore he had probable cause. 
Ironically, this effort would produce a rule that required a magistrate to 
review whatever facts a complainant offered in support of a search and 
determine whether sufficient suspicion existed to justify the search. The 
standard, in this generic form, could be applied to search (or. arrest) 
warrants for anything, not just liquor. From this generic standard, it would 
be no great leap to permit officers to perform arrests when the facts 
available to them provided probable cause to believe a crime had occurred 
and the suspect had committed it. 
The proposed amendment used vague language in an apparent attempt 
to dupe legislators into passing a law permitting a liquor search on the oath 
144. See John Neal, The Liquor Law of Maine - No. 2, MAINE EXPOSITOR, Sept. 7, 
1853, at 1; JOHN NEAL, WANDERING RECOLLECTIONS OF A SOMEWHAT BUSY LIFE 370-72 
(1869). 
145. See Neal Dow, John Neal and the Liquor Law of Maine, MAINE EXPOSITOR, Sept. 
14, 1853, at l (reprinting article from the newspaper State of Maine); John Neal, Mr. Neal's 
Reply, MAINE EXPOSITOR, Sept. 14, 1853, at l. 
146. John Neal stated that in drafting the Maine Law, Dow "had the help of a legal 
personage, for whom we profess to feel a sincere regard, in preparing the very portions 
which are most offensive and preposterous, and which mainly distinguish it from the old 
law. What those are, will be seen hereafter, as we proceed with the 'searching analysis' we 
have in our mind." John Neal, The Liquor Law of Maine, MAINE EXPOSITOR, Aug. 31, 1853, 
at 2. Given Dow's reference to Fox' s "technical assistance," the reference is not difficult to 
decode, but subsequent writings from Neal would clarify any ambiguity. John Neal would 
quickly grow considerably less charitable toward Fox when he, one week later, specifically 
named him, noting that he was " the gentleman who ranks among one of the putative fathers 
of the Maine Liquor Law, and is rather disposed to glory in the co-partnership, though he 
thinks it too merciful." Neal, supra note 145. 
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of complainants that they possessed probable cause. Under the 1853 bill, 
three persons who were competent to be witnesses in civil cases were 
required to allege that alcohol could be discovered in the requested 
search.147 A magistrate could not issue a warrant to search a dwelling unless 
be was convinced "by the testimony of witnesses upon oath, that there is 
reasonable r.ound for believing" that unlawfully possessed liquor was in 
the bouse.14 The new bill imposed a hefty penalty for perjury--Qne year in 
the state penitentiary.149 Magistrates were required to record the statements 
of these complainants, and the complainants were required to sign the 
transcriptions of their testimony. 
Opponents of the new bill alleged that the vague language in this 
provision would permit a search warrant on the mere oath of a complainant 
that he had reasonable grounds for his belief. Supporters of the bill 
suggested that the vague language did not change the law and pointed to the 
severe perjury penalty.150 The final version adopted by the legislature, and 
signed by Governor Hubbard on April 1, 1853, differed from the initial bill 
only in punishment for perjury- two years in the final bi11.151 
Temperance forces quickly tested the parameters of the new law, 
seeking warrants to search dwellings for liquor without providing any facts 
to support the complainants' conclusion that alcohol was indeed present. A 
number of decisions from the state's highest court concluded that 
complainants were required to provide facts supporting their suspicions, 
and when this factual support was lacking, the court arrested the judgment 
147. With the exception of women, this did not substantially open up the pool of 
potential complainants given Maine's otherwise very liberal suffrage laws. Women, of 
course, played a substantial role in the Temperance Movement, so this provision may have 
been perceived to greatly enlarge the number of infonnants appearing before magistrates. 
See generally HOLLY BERKLEY fLETCHER, GENDER AND THE AMERICAN TEMPERANCE 
MOVEMENT OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (2008). One member of the Maine Legislature 
objected to pennitting women and aliens to seek search warrants. Hon. Geo. M. Chase, 
Speech In Opposition to the Additional Bill for the Suppression of Drinking Houses and 
Tippling Shops (March 26, 1853), in MAINE EXPOSITOR, April27, 1853, at I. 
148. See REPORT OF JOINT SELECT COMMmEE ON So MUCH OF THE ADDRESS OF THE 
GoVERNOR AS RELATES TO THE ACT FOR 1lt£ SUPPRESSION OF DRINKING HOUSES AND 
TIPPLING SHOPS, 23 DOCUMENTS PRINTED BY ORDER OF THE LEGJSLA TURE OF THE STATE OF 
MAlNE 26 (1853) (reciting bill). 
149. !d. at 27. 
150. /d. at 4 (noting that to search a dwelling house, "evidence of witnesses [had to] be 
given in writing, on oath, filed with the magistrate, sufficient to show that there is good 
ground to believe that spirituous and intoxicating liquors are kept or deposited therein"). 
151. An Act in Addition to Chapter Two Hundred and Eleven of Eighteen Hundred and 
fifty One, ch. 48, § 11 , 1853 Maine Laws 51, 59. There do not appear to have been any 
convictions for perjury under the statute. There was one in Rhode Island under a similar 
statute, but this is the only one I have discovered reported either in the appellate reports, or 
newspapers, from the 1850s. See Perjury, MAINE EXPOSITOR, June 22, 1853, at 2. 
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against the defendant and returned his alcohol. 152 The court thus interpreted 
the amendment to the liquor law to have created a generic standard for 
warrant applications. So, while complainants were no longer required to 
observe, and testify to, a liquor sale to obtain a search warrant, they were 
required to testify to the facts they alleged provided reasonable grounds to 
believe alcohol present. 
The remedy the court afforded for the violation was certainly novel. 
Arresting the judgment of a lower court because of a defect in the warrant 
effectively forbade a court to consider the fruit of an unlawful search. 153 
These decisions appear to be the first American decisions based on the 
principle modem lawyers have come to know as the exclusionary rule.154 
Two decades later, the court would hold that the fruits of an officer's 
unlawful, warrantless search were admissible, retreating from the full 
implications of the new remedy it had fashioned. 155 Even this limited 
version of the exclusionary rule, however, represented a substantial 
innovation in the law as reliable evidence had always been admissible 
throughout Anglo-American history regardless of how it was discovered.156 
152. See, e.g., State v. Staples, 37 Me. 228, 230 (1854) (holding mere aHegation of 
presence of alcohol insufficient for a warrant); State v. Spirituous Liquors, 39 Me. 262, 263 
(1855) (holding the warrant was "fatally defective" because it was not signed by the 
witnesses). 
153. The court had previously concluded that complaints seeking warrants that failed to 
allege that the alcohol was intended for sale in the town where it was housed were defective 
and the proceedings under them must be quashed. See State v. Spirituous Liquor, 33 Me. 
527, 530 (1852). The exclusionary rule had thus been previously established in a case in 
which the pleadings in the complaint were inadequate. The cases, following the 1853 law, 
applied this remedy to a failure in the sufficiency of the proof supporting the allegations in 
the complaint. See Staples, 37 Me. at 229-30. 
154. It is frequently assumed that the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence "first 
appeared in a cryptic statement in the 1886 decision Boyd v. United States, [and] did not 
fully emerge until the 1914 decision in Weeks v. United States." Davies, supra note 16, at 
622- 23 (citation omitted). 
155. See State v. McCann, 61 Me. 116, 118 (1873) (holding conviction under liquor 
law will not be disturbed when evidence is unlawfully obtained by officer who acted without 
a warrant). 
156. Amar, supra note 42 at 785--87; Davies, supra note 16 at 623- 24 n.17 (citing 
Commonwealth v. Dana, 443 Mass. (2 Met.) 329 (1841)) ("The Massachusetts Supreme 
Court first upheld the constitutionality of the statute but nevertheless announced that it was 
contrary to common taw to permit an inquiry into how evidence was obtained during the 
course of a trial, a rule that became known as the ' collateral issue' doctrine.") Federal courts 
well into the twentieth century would wrestle with a variety of justifications for the 
exclusionary rule. See Davies, supra note 16, at 624-25; Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp 
v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future of the Exc/[u]sionary Rule in 
Search-and-Seiz[u]re Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1372-77 (1983). The judicially 
created remedy in the mid-nineteenth century- that returned the defendant's liquor and 
dismissed the conviction against him-can only be explained by an effort to make the 
defendant whole after having been unlawfully prosecuted for a crime that the courts found to 
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Much of the fossil record of modem criminal procedure can thus be 
found in the Supreme Judicial Court's interpretation of the nation 's first 
prohibitory laws. With this 1853 modification to the liquor law, and its 
interpretation by the court, Maine bad fashioned a standard for search 
warrants that would be familiar to a twenty-first century lawyer. Affiants 
were no longer permitted to provide what modem Supreme Court decisions 
describe as "bare bones" affidavits.157 The actual practice of justices of the 
peace-at least in liquor cases-now conformed with Blackstone's 
description of a magistrate's role in reviewing requests for search warrants. 
For the first time, treatises in Maine contained forms for magistrates to 
record the facts supporting the allegations of complainants.158 And 
suppression of evidence replaced tort suits as the mechanism for preventing 
at least a category of illegal searches. The historical roots of the 
exclusionary rule may, therefore, be greater than its critics-and even its 
proponents-have recognized.159 Justice Potter Stewart observed in the 
Columbia Law Review that the "first case associated with the exclusionary 
rule is Boyd v. United States" from 1886.'60 However, the rule has a 
somewhat older lineage than that once one looks to state cases-in Maine, a 
form of the rule was developed in response to a new power to search for 
liquor. So, while it is certainly true that no form of the exclusionary rule 
existed during the colonial era or in the early years of the republic, a 
version of the exclusionary rule was fashioned contemporaneously with 
ordinary officers acquiring the discretion of customs officers.161 
be of dubious legitimacy. See Robert Post, Federalism, Positive Law, and the Emergence of 
the American Administrative State: Prohibition in the Taft Court Era, 48 WM. & MARY L. 
REv. 1, 7 (2006) (observing that the courts in the twentieth century doubted the legitimacy of 
Prohibition). 
157. See e.g. , United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 915, 923 n.24 (1984); Illinois v. 
Gates, 462 U.S. 213,239 (1983). 
158. BENJAMIN KINGSBURY, JR., THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE: DESIGNED TO BE A GUIDE 
TO JUSTICES OF THE PEACE, FOR THE STATE OF MAINE 295 (Portland, Sanborn & Carter 1852). 
159. See e.g., Luke M. Milligan, The Source-Centric Framework to the Exclusionary 
Rule, 28 CARDOzo L. REv. 2739, 2747-56 (2007) (looking at Justice Holmes' opinion in 
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920), to explain the modem 
exclusionary rule); Jerry E. Norton, The Exclusionary Rule Reconsidered: Restoring the 
Status Quo Ante, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 261, 263-67 (1998) (describing the development 
of the exclusionary rule). 
160. Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, 
Development, and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. 
L. REv. 1365, 1372 (1983). 
161. Thomas Davies has concluded that the United States Supreme Court "transferred 
[an] expanded concept of goverrunent illegality to the new law enforcement officer by ruling 
in 1914 in Weeks that a federal marshal's unlawful warrantless search of a residence violated 
the Fourth Amendment and, thus, was subject to the constitutional logic of nullity." Davies, 
supra note 16, at 625. The exclusionary rule, he argues, "arose contemporaneously with the 
modem conception of the modem law enforcement officer." /d. The process he describes 
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Versions of Maine's prohibitory law quickly spread through the 
country, winning acceEtance in legislatures in every region of the country 
except the Southeast. 1 2 The year after Maine adopted the prohibitory law 
with its search and seizure provision, a bill containing very similar 
provisions was positively reported out of a committee of the New York 
Legislature.163 In a preview of future events, Democratic Governor Horatio 
Seymour objected to the infringement of civil liberties in the Maine Law.164 
Later Seymour would oppose capital punishment and object to Abraham 
Lincoln's arbitrary arrests of those suspected of disloyalty .165 One of his 
earliest public positions advancing a civil libertarian position, however, was 
his objection to the Maine Law. 
Governor Seymour objected that the Maine Law permitted searches not 
previously allowed in ordinary criminal cases that worked a violation of the 
federal constitution.166 Seymour's criticism .demonstrated the most precise 
knowledge of search and seizure law of any of the objections to the 
nineteenth-century prohibitory laws. Searches had long been authorized on 
far less certainty that a crime had occurred, but not searches to reveal 
evidence of ordinary crimes. Customs searches had been permitted 
whenever customs or revenue officers had probable cause to believe goods 
had been unlawfully imported, or that required taxes had not been paid on 
them.167 Throughout American history, however, customs and revenue 
occurring at the federal level seems to have occurred at the state level, first in Maine, then in 
states adopting the exclusionary rule as a new type of crime greatly expanded the role of 
officers. 
162. See WILLIAM BLACKWOOD & SONS, BLACKWOOD'S EDINBURGH MAGAZINE, at 211 
(1867) (describing the thirteen states to adopt the Maine Law and the efforts to secure its 
adoption in all the states); STEWART MITCHELL, HORATIO SEYMOUR OF NEW YORK 154 
(1938) ("One state after another played with the reform until Maine laws were being argued 
over almost everywhere."). 
It has been assumed that the Prohibition movement was not successful beyond 
these regions because of the linkage between the Prohibition and Abolition movements. 
Prohibition, however, came very close to becoming Jaw in at least parts of the South in the 
mid-nineteenth century. See Thomas H. Appleton, Jr., "Moral Suasion Has Had it 's Day": 
From Temperance to Prohibition in Antebellum Kentucky, in JoHN DAVID SMITH & THOMAS 
H. APPLETON, JR. (eds.), A MYTHIC LAND APART: REASSESSING SOUTHERNERS AND THEIR 
HISTORY 19-42 (1997). 
163. DocUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 132. 
164. See MITCHELL, supra note 162, at t 56. 
165. See Governor Horatio Seymour, Annual Message, (January 7, 1863) in V 
MESSAGES OF THE GOVERNORS, COMPRISING EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS TO THE 
LEGISLATURE AND OTHER PAPERS RELATING TO LEGISLATION FROM THE ORGANIZATION OF 
THE FlRST COLONIAL AsSEMBLY IN 1683 TO AND INCLUDING THE YEAR 1906 465 (Charles 
Lincoln ed., 1909) (describing opposition to death penalty); MITCHELL, supra note 162, at 
267; see generally MARK E. NEELY, THE FATE OF LlBERTY: ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND CIVIL 
LIBERTIES (1991 ). 
166. Governor Seymour's Message, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 1852, at 3. 
167. Thomas, supra note I, at 1477, 1493. 
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officers had been regarded to have greater searching authority than ordinary 
police officers.168 Giving every officer in America the power to search 
homes for alcohol that customs officers had to search warehouses for 
untaxed goods offended Seymour. The Governor recognized that the Maine 
Law was breaking down the separate system of criminal procedure by 
giving ordinary officers powers comparable to customs agents. 169 Even the 
supporters of the Maine Law recognized that the search and seizure 
provision had worked a change; they however applauded the change. 
Notwithstanding Governor Seymour's objections, the Maine Law 
would be well received in his state-and a number of others. A stronger 
version of the law passed both houses of the New York Legislature in 1854. 
Under this version, a search was authorized if any two voters complained 
that unlawful alcohol was kept for sale in the county or town in which the 
complaint was made. Seymour vetoed this bill, offering in 1854 as one of 
his reasons that it effectively authorized general searches.170 In contrast to 
his precision in his 1852 critique, this was sloppy. There had never been 
agreement on the principle that made general searches objectionable, but 
New York's version of the Maine Law certainly required as much 
specificity as any procedure for authorizing customs or revenue searches in 
168. Perhaps recognizing an opening to expand the powers of federal officers, within a 
decade of the Maine Law's widespread adoption, Congress expanded the power of customs 
officials to seize the books and papers of merchants that could be used to demonstrate 
revenue and import violations. See S.B. EATON, SEIZING BOOKS AND PAPERS UNDER THE 
REVENUE LAWS 5 (1874). This law would be famously rejected in the landmark case of Boyd 
v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), forbidding the seizure of books or records that merely 
recorded evidence that a crime had occurred, a rule which endured until the realities of the 
administrative state required the capacity to examine such records. See William J. Stuntz, 
The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE L.J. 393,419-28 (1995). 
169. Seymour specifically charged that the search warrants issued under the Maine Law 
would provide for the general warrants that the Fourth Amendment had forbidden. Of 
course, the Fourth Amendment's limitations did not apply to the states, but despite Supreme 
Court precedent clearly stating this, there was a widespread belief in the mid-nineteenth 
century that they did. See Jason Mazzone, The Bill of Rights in Early State Courts, 92 MINN. 
L. REv. 1, 35-37 (2007). Seymour's description of the warrants, authorized under this law as 
"general warrants," seems a sloppier criticism than one might expect from Seymour given 
the precision of his description of the state of search and seizure law in 1852. Governor 
Seymour's Message, supra note 166, at 3. There had been a wide range of thought on 
exactly what made general warrants problematic. See CUDDIHY, supra note 7, at 580-81. 
The requirements under the Maine Law for a search warrant satisfied even the original 
Virginia Constitution's very thorough objection to general warrants. See Davies, supra note 
61 , atl00. 
170. MITCHELL, supra note 162, at 155-56; Governor Horatio Seymour, Veto of a Bill 
Entitled "An Act for Suppression of intemperance," (March 31, 1854) in IV MESSAGES OF 
THE GOVERNORS, COMPRISING EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS TO THE LEG ISLA TUR.E AND 
OTHER PAPERS RELATING TO LEGISLATION FROM THE 0RGANIZA TION OF THE FIRST COLONIAL 
ASSEMBLY IN 1683 TO AND INCLUDING THE YEAR 1906 755 (Charles Lincoln ed., 1909). 
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the early republic. 171 It also required more assurances of accuracy than were 
required for any application for a customs search. Two witnesses were 
required to swear that probable cause existed and at least one of them had to 
provide facts under oath supporting their conclusions.172 There was, 
however, an analogy to the type of fear that general searches produced: 
widespread searches. The search provision of the Maine Law sought to 
discover something that many New Yorkers had in their possession, and 
intended to keep in their possession. 
With the temperance lobby now solidly against him, Horatio Seymour, 
like John Dana in Maine before him, lost the subsequent election. 
Seymour's successor Myron Clark signed into law a version of the Maine 
Law slightly different from the one Seymour vetoed. 173 Under this version, 
any "credible person" could complain to a magistrate that alcohol was kept 
or deposited in violation of the law.174 The complainant was required to 
provide in writing, under oath or on affirmation, "the facts and 
circumstances upon which such belief is founded."175 The statute then 
expressly recognized the screening role that the magistrate was to play. A 
magistrate was to issue the search warrant only "if he [was] satisfied that 
there [was] probable cause for said belief."176 Earlier versions of the Maine 
171. Seymour contended that alcohol could not be particularly described but certainly 
the same was true for many things for which search warrants had been sought throughout 
Anglo-American history. Governor Seymour's Message, supra note 166, at 3. Money, for 
instance, was certainly fungible. 
172. It is not clear what inspired the multiple complainant rule that began with the 
original version of the Maine Law. Multiple witnesses were of course required in treason 
prosecutions. See L.M. Hill, The Two-Witness Rule in English Treason Trials: Some 
Comments on the Emergence of Procedural Law, 12 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 95, 95 (1968); John 
H. Wigmore, Required Numbers of Witnesses: A Brief History of the Numerical System in 
England, 15 HARV. L. REv. 83,99 (1901). 
173. Much like Henry Dutton in Connecticut, Myron Clark established himself as one 
of the chief proponents of the Maine Law and, like Dutton, this stance launched him into a 
brief stay in the Governor's Office. See discussion supra note 26 (discussing Dutton); see 
also WILLIAM E . GIENAPP, lHE ORIGINS OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY, 1852- 1856 153 (1987); 
MYRON HOLLEY CLARK, THE MAINE LAW: SPEECH OF HON. MYRON H . CLARK, 29TH 
DISTRICT, ON 1lfE BILL FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF INTEMPERANCE IN THE SENATE, MARCH 3D 
1854. 
Thomas Davies and Fabio Arcila disagree as to whether colonial and early 
American magistrates screened the basis a complainant offered for believing that stolen 
goods would be found in a particular location. The nineteenth-century liquor cases tend to 
suggest that Professor Arcila has the better end of this argument. The Connecticut Supreme 
Court, in affirming Connecticut's version of the Maine Law, asserted that a bare bones 
allegation that stolen goods could be located in a particular location satisfied the state 
constitution's search and seizure provision. Lowrey v. Gridley, 30 Conn. 450, 459~0 
( I 862). 
174. DocUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 132, at 18. 
175. Jd. 
176. Jd. 
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Law had described the process in terms that were uniquely related to a 
liquor search. The search and seizure provision in this version was written 
in a very generic fashion and resembles language in twentieth-century 
hornbooks describing the probable cause requirement. 
Probable cause in the ordinary criminal justice system was no longer 
merely a pleading requirement that victims alleged to obtain a warrant; it 
became the factual threshold that could be satisfied by the testimony of any 
"credible person." Police officers could satisfy this requirement-and the 
statute even recognized that police officers could rely on informants to 
satisfy this requirement. 171 The sworn written statement could offer the 
facts and circumstances known to the affiant, or the facts and circumstances 
known to "some other person."178 ln a host of states, the modern probable 
cause standard for obtaining a search warrant was no longer confined to 
customs cases, and much of the country embraced the mechanism the courts 
of Maine developed to remedy and prevent unlawful liquor searches. 
Failure to comply with the requirements of liquor warrants required 
exclusion of the fruits of ensuing searches in New York and a number of 
other states just as it did in Maine. 179 
New York's experiment with Prohibition ended almost as soon as it 
began.180 Within a few months of the Maine Law's passage, an Albany jury 
had acquitted William Landon of violating the Maine Law despite clear 
177. See Davies, supra note 61 at 187- 88 (probable cause standard made hearsay 
evidence sufficient for a warrant); see Lane, supra note 6, at 10-ll (describing the role of 
early police officers as developing an "intimate familiarity" with the criminals they were 
policing). 
178. DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 132, at 18. 
179. See People v. Toynbee, 11 How. Pr. 289, 330 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1855) ("The 
complaint [analogous to the modem affidavit in support of a search warrant] is a substitute 
for an indictment . .. and requires at least as much particularity . ... "); see also State v. 
Twenty-Five Packages of Liquor, 38 Vt. 387, 391 (1866) (recognizing that forfeiture action 
could be quashed for failure to have a sufficiently particular search warrant); Fisher v. 
McGirr, l Gray I, 2 (Mass. 1854) (action for value of seized liquor permitted on the basis of 
an insufficient search warrant). 
Using an improper search as the basis for dismissing a prosecution would continue 
into the twentieth century. See In re Huff, 120 N.Y.S. 1070 (N.Y. App. Div. 1910) 
(recognizing that action against forfeited liquor can be dismissed if the search warrant for its 
discovery is invalid); Foley v. One Hundred & Eighty Bottles of Liquor, 204 N.Y. 623 (N.Y. 
1912) (affirming denial of motion to dismiss on this ground). Courts began to expand this 
rule beyond searches for liquor that were based on invalid search warrants. See State v. 
Kinney, 185 N.Y.S. 645 (N.Y. Sup. 1920) (dismissing indictment for weapon and returning 
revolver seized by an invalid warrant); People v. Jakira, 193 N.Y.S. 206 (N.Y. Gen. Session. 
1922} (gun seized illegally and without warrant excluded}. 
180. See John Joseph Coffey, A Political History of the Temperance Movement in New 
York State, 1808-1920, at 90-96 (May 1976) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Pennsylvania 
State) (on file with author}; DocUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 132, at 18; People v. 
Berberricb, 20 Barb. 168, 266 (1855) (declaring New York' s version of the Maine Law 
unconstitutional). 
2011] THE MODERN HISTORY OF PROBABLE CAUSE 417 
evidence to the contraf(-his lawyer had argued to the jury that the law 
was unconstitutional.18 The following year, the New York Court of 
Appeals agreed. 182 Rather than cure the defects the court identified in the 
law, the legislature returned to a licensing scheme that strictly re~lated 
who could obtain a license and forbid the sale of alcohol on Sundays. 83 The 
Maine Law had nevertheless introduced New York's criminal justice 
system to a search mechanism unmoored from a victim's complaint. 
With the new standard came police investigations of victimless crime. 
Police searches to discover vice in the early days of the New York 
Municipal Police were rare. 184 The first manual for police officers 
mentioned the possibility of a search warrant only to discover stolen goods; 
searches initiated by police to discover evidence of victimless crimes were 
not mentioned. 185 In the 1870s, private anti-crime organizations began to 
file complaints seeking arrest and search warrants in cases involving the 
181. See JOHN K. PORTER, ARGUMENT OF JOHN K. PORTER ON THE TRIAL OF WILLIAM 
LANDON, ACQUITTED JULY 21 , 1855, ON A CHARGE OF VIOLATING THE PROHIBITORY LAW 
{Albany, H.H. VanDyck 1855) in Vll AMERICAN STATE TRlALS 901-53 (John 0. Lawson, 
ed., 1917). 
182. Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378, 486 (1856); see also William John Jackson, 
Prohibition as an Issue in New York State Politics 1836-1933 (February 11, 1974) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University) (Sacremento State Library). 
183. Members of the state legislature were aware that New York Mayor Fernando 
Wood would thwart efforts to enforce the new licensing regulation, just as he had done with 
the Maine Law. When they created the new version of liquor violation, legislators replaced 
the mayor-controlled Municipal Police Force that it had permitted the City ofNew York to 
create in 1844 with the Metropolitan Police Force, established under the control of a board 
appointed by the Governor. An Act of Apr. 15, to Establish a Metropolitan Police District 
and to Provide for the Government Thereof, New York Laws 1857, ch. 569, 1857 N.Y. 
Laws 200. The new force was responsible for policing the counties of New York, Kings, 
Westchester and Richmond, rather than just Manhattan. /d. at 200. 
184. Prior to the Maine Law, the police had a policy of responding to alleged liquor law 
violations {i.e., selling without a license or selling on Sunday) only if there was a complaint. 
See RICHARDSON, supra note 54, at 110. There was a coordinated raid of brothels in 1850, 
but other than Mayor Fernando Wood's efforts against lower-class street walkers between 
1855 and 1858 {which obviously would not involve the search of any sort of dwelling), there 
was no substantial subsequent police action against prostitution until the latter part of the 
century. See BURROWS& WALLACE, supra note 4, at 807 {describing 1850 raids); /d. at 1163 
(describing raids of gambling houses and brothels authorized by Mayor Grace in 1886); 
TIMOTHY J. GJLFOYLE, CITY OF EROS: NEW YORK CITY, PROSTITUTION, AND THE 
COMMERCIALIZATION OF SEX, 1790-1920, at 183-84 {1992); see also ANN FABIAN, CARD 
SHARPS AND BUCKET SHOPS: GAMBLING IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA, at 97 (1999) 
(discussing lack of gambling enforcement from creation of Municipal Police Force through 
Civil War); RICHARDSON, supra note 54, at 154. Given the amount of corrupt coordination 
between the police and prostitution in the late nineteenth-century, the raids of the late 
nineteenth century were often more attributable to failure to pay "protection" money to 
police than the City's serious effort to eliminate prostitution. 
185. See NEW YoRK, RULES AND REGULATIONS, supra note 90, at 58. 
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victimless crimes of pornography, prostitution, gambling and liquor law 
violations.186 By the 1880s, a statute specifically authorized police captains 
to seek warrants to search premises suspected of being houses of 
prostitution.187 Police-initiated searches to discover evidence of gambling 
and alcohol sales without a license, or sales on Sundays occurred with 
frequency in the latter part of the nineteenth century \most often when the 
police had not been given their protection money). 88 The word "raid" 
began to regularly appear in appellate reports by the 1890s.189 
The Maine Law in New York provided more than just an introduction 
to a formal search mechanism that could be initiated by someone other than 
a crime victim. The vigorous debate over the search and seizure aspects of 
the Maine Law appears to have put to rest any question about the 
legitimacy of searches initiated by suspicions developed by police officers. 
Opponents of the Maine Law had objected both to the prohibition of 
alcohol sales and the expansion of police discretion. In the latter half of the 
nineteenth century, there were proposals to regulate rather than prohibit 
186. See Dan Greenberg & Thomas H. Tobiason, The New Legal Puritanism of 
Catherine MacKinnon, 54 OHIO Sr. L.J. 1375, 1377-78 (1993) (citing Felice F. Lewis, 
Literature, Obscenity, & Law 10 (1976)); Louis H. Pollack. Review of: Federal Censorship: 
Obscenity in the Mail, 75 HARV. L. REv. 1681 (1962). 
187. People ex rei. Eakins v. Roosevelt, 44 N.Y.S. 1003 (N.Y. 1897). This was one 
example of many in the late nineteenth century of members of anti-vice societies who went 
undercover to discover prostitution and its lack of enforcement. See e.g., GILFOYLE, supra 
note 184, at 181-96 (describing these societies). The Court's opinion in Eakins colorfully 
describes, using appropriately prudish language, the adventures of the undercover member 
of an anti-vice society who discovered a brothel and reported the failure of police to close it. 
The citizen-informant entered a dwelling between 2:00 and 3:00am one morning, saw 16 to 
20 women huddled around a few men while women continued to enter and leave the room 
and went upstairs with one of the women upon his payment of the 25 cents rent for the room. 
On his way to the room, he "saw and heard the most disgusting evidence of vice." Eakins, 44 
N .Y.S. at 1007. 
Technically, prostitution itself was not a crime in New York in the second half of 
the nineteenth century, only the crime of maintaining a house of prostitution. See THOMAS C. 
MACKEY, RED LIGHTS OUT: A LEGAL HISTORY OF PROHIBITION, DISORDERLY HOUSES AND 
VICE DISTRICTS, 93-118 (1987); William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal 
Law, 100 MICH. L. REv. SOS, 573-74 (2001) ("Before the late nineteenth century, most 
jurisdictions had no prostitution statutes; the relevant crime was running a ' disorderly 
house, ' a more circumscribed offense." ). 
188. Police corruption was rampant in the late nineteenth century. Bars, gambling 
houses, and brothels regularly paid police to avoid prosecution. EDMUND MORRIS, THE RISE 
OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT 499 (200 I). 
189. See Mott v. Mott, 38 N.Y.S. 261 , 262 (N.Y. 1896) (divorce action in which 
husband's alleged adultery with a prostitute was testified to by a woman who saw the man in 
an apartment she kept; the husband was in the apartment a day or two before a police raid); 
People ex rei. Doherty v. Police Com' rs of New York, 84 Hun. 64, 66 (1895) (operator of 
house of ill fame claimed that officer extorted money from her so that she could avoid being 
raided again); People ex rei.. Cross v. Martin, 32 N.Y.S. 933 (N.Y. 1895). 
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gambling and prostitution.190 There were advocates of legalized gambling 
and prostitution, just as there were for lawful alcohol sales. 191 There were, 
however, no objections to the power of the police to conduct the raids 
necessary to enforce the prohibition on these vices.192 Police·initiated and 
police-conducted investigations had come to be accepted by the latter part 
of the nineteenth century. Probable cause that could be satisfied by any 
person with relevant information, including officers, had become an 
unquestionably sufficient criterion for police searches. 
Ill. LAW ENFORCEMENT NEEDS PROMPTED A BROADER ARREST POWER 
The police had no obvious ally in advocating a less restrictive standard 
for arrests. While prohibitionists and police wanted relaxed standards for 
conducting searches-prohibitionists to discover liquor, police to discover 
evidence of crime more generally-no analogous group shared the interest 
of police in readily being able to take suspects into custody. The success of 
the more police-friendly arrest standard turned alone on poJicymakers' 
interest in giving police greater discretion and their ability to exercise that 
discretion responsibly. The emergence of probable cause as a standard 
sufficient for arrest occurred more slowly in New York than in other 
190. A variety of laws were passed in the nineteenth century that allowed gambling in 
certain circumstances. See BURROWS & WALLACE, supra note 4, at 1164. The idea of 
legalizing prostitution received less serious attention but was nevertheless considered. See 
RICHARDSON, supra note 54, at 154 (discussing post-Civil War discussion to license and 
regulate prostitution as Union army had done in the occupied City of Nashville, Tennessee). 
For discussion of the nation's first legalized prostitution, see THOMAS PETER LOWRY, THE 
STORIES THE SOLDIERS WOULDN' T TELL: SEX rN THE ClVIL WAR 76-82 (1994); WALTER T. 
DURHAM, RELUCTANT PARTNERS: NASHVlLLE AND THE UNION, JULY I, 1863 TOJUNE30, 1865 
(1987). Contemporaneous with General Hood's order in Nashville, Great Britain's 
Contagious Disease Act of 1864 effectively legalized prostitution. See BURROWS & 
WALLACE, supra note 4, at 1162. 
191. Prostitution and gambling appealed to a smaller audience-at least a smaller 
audience willing to publicly associate themselves with these acts-than drinking. See 
Michael Woodiwiss & Dick Hobbs, Organized Evil and the Atlantic Alliance: Moral Panics 
and the Rhetoric of Organized Crime Policing in American and Britain 49 BRIT. J. 
CR£MINOLOGY 106, 109 (2009) (observing that proponent of legalized gambling lacked the 
financial wherewithal of the advocates of repealing Prohibition). 
192. The procedural requirements for warrants that the Maine Law had introduced 
remained. In 1891, an appellate division of the New York Supreme Court held that an 
affidavit for a search warrant failed to state the facts supporting the affiant's suspicions that 
his stolen goods could be found in the location to be searched. The court further held that 
this failure in the affidavit prevented the justice of the peace from obtaining jurisdiction to 
issue the warrant, leaving him liable to a civil action. Wallace v. Williams, 14 N.Y.S. 180 
(N.Y. Gen. Term 1891). Remarkably, this case involved a warrant to locate stolen goods, the 
paradigm search warrant in the eighteenth century, which had been authorized on a victim's 
mere assertion that he had probable cause to believe (or, before the adoption of revised 
statutes in several states, suspect) that the goods could be located in the place identified. 
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jurisdictions, and a quirk of legislative timing reversed the broader standard 
previously conferred on officers. Nevertheless, New York's experience is 
representative in illustrating the forces at play in expanding the arrest 
powers of police and how tenuously police departments held these powers 
in their early years. 
The fear New Yorkers had of police power certainly did not dissipate 
with the creation of the Municipal Police Department in 1845.193 Though 
the new department advocated legal refonn to permit officers to arrest on 
mere probable cause of a felony, neither the courts of New York, nor the 
New York Legislature, were initially willing to embrace this new arrest 
standard. In 1853, New York courts began to accept probable cause as a 
sufficient basis for a warrantless felony arrest.194 There was, however, an 
important difference between the probable cause standard for search and 
arrest warrants and the probable cause standard for warrantless arrests. 
Officers, not magistrates, obviously determined whether probable cause 
existed to justify a warrantless arrest, and these officers were known for 
rampant violence and arbitrary arrests when the New York Legislature 
adopted its Code of Criminal Procedure in 1881. 195 By considering this 
code in the early 1880s, New York politicians were forced to take a stand 
against the police during a period of fairly serious misconduct. By the 
1890s, Progressive refonners had successfully blamed police misconduct 
on a culture of corruption and proposed good government refonns as a 
cure.196 In the early 1880s, however, a limit on the discretion of officers to 
make warrantless arrests may well have seemed to be a decent remedy for 
arbitrary arrests. 197 
Americans were generally less willing, or at least slower, than their 
English counterparts to expand the discretionary powers of police 
officers-New Yorkers would appear especially unwilling to extend 
prerogatives to them. The King's Bench adopted the rule American lawyers 
would presently recognize as the standard for warrantless arrests in 1827-
if an officer bad probable cause to believe that a crime had been committed 
and that the person taken into custody committed it, the officer is not liable 
for false arrest even if the suspect he took into custody was factually 
innocent.198 This modification of the English law may have been prompted 
by a perception that constables needed more tools at their disposal to deal 
193. New York' s force represented the second full-time patrol force, second only to 
London's modem police force, created in 1829. WILBUR R. MILLER, POLICE AUTHORITY IN 
LoNDON AND NEW YORK CITY 1830-1870, 8JOURNALOFSOCIALHISTORY 81 , 81 (1975). 
194. Bums v. Erben, 40 N.Y. 463 (N.Y. 1869). 
195. See JOHNSON, supra note 4, at 15- 16. 
196. See Oliver, supra note 57, at 468-83. See generally JayS. Berman, POLICE 
ADMINISTRATION AND PROGRESSIVE REFORM: THEODORE ROOSEVELT AS POLICE 
COMMISSIONER OF NEW YORK ( 1987). 
197. JoHNSON, supra note 4 at 15-16. 
198. Beckwith v. Philby. (1827) 108 Eng. Rep. 585 (K.B.); 6 Bam. & Cress. 635. 
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with increasing concerns of crime and violence, particularly in urban areas. 
The new arrest rule was not, however, the product of pressure from, what 
we would call in modem times, the law enforcement lobby. The 
Metropolitan London Police Department would not be established for 
another two years.199 
A number of American states followed the English precedent, adopting 
the new standard before the creation of metropolitan police forces. Cases in 
Massachusetts and Pennsylvania adopting probable cause as the standard 
for a warrantless arrest pre-dated the creation of modem police departments 
in Boston and Philadelphia by a few years?00 Tennessee adopted the 
probable cause standard decades before the creation of modem police 
forces in Nashville or Memphis.201 New York did not, however, accept this 
standard as a basis for warrantless arrests until almost a decade after the 
creation of the Municipal Police Force. 
The New York Muncipal Police Department was created in 1846 and 
its officers were instructed that they could arrest any "person who has 
committed a felony, or who for reasonable cause, is suspected of having 
committed a felony."202 As late as 1852, however, Oliver Barbour's treatise 
on New York criminal law observed that officers were permitted to arrest 
on the basis of probable cause only if a felony bad in fact been 
comrnitted.203 It was not until 1853 that two justices of the New York 
Supreme Court, the trial level court, in this case sitting in New York City, 
acknowledged in dicta the power of officers to arrest a felony suspect when 
there is 'just suspicion. "204 While this probable cause arrest standard would 
be accepted in New York, at least for a few decades, it was certainly not an 
uncontroversial standard. 
Burns v. Erben, decided by a three-judge appellate panel of the New 
York Superior Court in 1864, would reveal that New York courts were not 
entirely comfortable with the new arrest standard.205 The court did not have 
199. Craig D. Uchida, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERICAN POLICE: AN HISTORICAL 
OVERVIEW, 7 (2004). 
200. Rohan v. Swain, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 281, 282 (1850); Russell v. Shuster, 8 Watts 
& Serg. 308, 309 (Pa. 1844); Eanes v. State, 25 Tenn. 53, 54 (Tenn. 1845). 
201. See Eanes, 25 Tenn. at 54. 
202. NEW YORK, RULES AND REGULATIONS, supra note 90, at 31 . 
203. OLIVER L. BARBOUR, A TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW OF THE STATE OF NEW 
YORK (Albany, Gould, Banks 2d ed. 1852). 
204. Pratt v. Hill, 16 Barb. 303 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1853). Pratt cites Holley v. Mix, 3 Wend. 
350, 353 (N.Y. 1829) for the proposition that an officer's suspicion was sufficient for a 
felony arrest, but as Thomas Davies observes, Holley was a case recognizing only an 
officer's immunity for arresting without a warrant when a citizen charged that the suspect 
had committed a crime. Davies, supra note 5, at 635 n.239. 
205. There was a passing reference in dicta to officers being pennitted to arrest on mere 
probable cause the year before Burns was decided. See Brown v. Chadsey, 39 Barb. 252, 263 
(NY Supreme Ct, NY County 1863) ("probable cause, or reasonable grounds of suspicion 
against the party arrested, afford no justification of an arrest or imprisonment which is 
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to acknowledge the legitimacy of the probable cause standard to rule in 
favor of the officer in this case in which the plaintiff alleged a wrongful 
arrest. The officer in Bu,rns made the arrest after a complainant alleged the 
suspect had stolen his property.206 The officer was justified under well-
established law, as a crime had in fact been committed. The officer was, 
however, represented by the Corporation Counsel for the City of New 
York, who hoped to use this case to clearly establish the new arrest 
standard. The City's lawyer observed that the law creating the New York 
Metropolitan Police had given members of the new police force the 
warrantless arrest powers of constables, which he ar~ed included the 
power to arrest when an officer had probable cause.20 In support of his 
description of a constable's authority, counsel offered the authority of 
Beckwith v. Phi/by from 1827, which several American jurisdictions had 
adopted but New York courts had not embraced?08 
The court accepted the probable cause arrest standard the City 
advocated, but its reasoning differed from the City's in an important 
respect. The court observed that the "Metropolitan Police Act allow[ ed] the 
officers of police to arrest persons suspected by them, without warrant, 
where there is reason to believe a felony has been committed. "209 The court 
therefore attributed the probable cause standard to the statute itself, 
concluding that the statute itself embraced the probable cause standard. The 
statute of course only gave officers the power of constables, but the court 
appears to have been reluctant to interpret the power of constables to 
include this standard. If this (elected) court accepted the English precedent, 
however, it would bear the responsibility for defining the power of 
constables, something it likely did not want to appear to do. It was far more 
comfortable attributing this standard, which it recognized to entrust a 
"dangerous power" in the police, to the legislature.210 
There were certainly strong supporters of the probable cause arrest 
standard in New York who were less sheepish. A three-judge panel of the 
New York Supreme Court for New York County was bolder in its 
reasoning one year later when it affirmed the rule announced in Burns. The 
court questioned rhetorically, "How, in the great cities of the land, could 
police power be exercised, if every police officer is liable to a civil action 
for false imprisonment, if persons arrested upon probable cause shall 
afterwards be found innocent? Police authority would be a sham, its officers 
be made cowards, and government become a failure."211 
without authority oflaw."). 
206. Bums v. Erben, 26 How. Pr. 273 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1864). 
207. /d. 
208. See Davies, supra note 5, at 636 (discussing Holley v. Mix, 3 Wend 350 (1829)). 
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The fear of officers' discretion was, however, particularly strong in the 
second half of the nineteenth century in New York. When the Burns case 
was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, it was clear that serious 
questions remained about conferring discretion on officers to evaluate 
whether evidence was sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest. Two judges 
wrote opinions in Burns, each finding the arrest acceptable, though neither 
would accept the probable cause arrest standard. Judge Woodruff concluded 
that a warrantless arrest by an officer was acceptable, even if no crime had 
been committed, if the officer "acted upon information from another which 
he had reason to believe."212 In the early nineteenth century, an officer's 
powers had been expanded to permit a warrantless arrest if a complainant 
had made a positive charge against the would-be arrestee--in other words, 
something analogous to a victim's complaint to a magistrate.213 Under this 
long-standing justification for a warrantless arrest, not the new probable 
cause standard, Woodruff found the officer's actions justified. Judge James 
was more clear in his refusal to endorse the new arrest standard. He also 
wrote an opinion in Burns, concluding that "[p]robable cause, or reasonable 
ground, for suspicion . . . affords no justification for an arrest or 
imprisonment, unless a felony has actually been committed."214 
New York's particular concern with police powers is difficult to 
explain.Z15 New York's unique history may offer some insight. Historians 
typically explain early concerns about the powers of modem American 
police as a manifestation of Revolutionary-Era fears of standing armies.Z 16 
Lingering fears about standing armies seem to have had particular salience 
in New York-the concern had successfully thwarted the effort to create a 
London-style modem police force in the 1830s.Z17 Certainly there was a fear 
of standing armies throughout the young republic, but there may be a 
reason that the analogy to modem police forces got particular traction in 
New York.218 Only New York, Philadelphia, and Boston bad experienced 
British occupation during the Revolutionary War. Boston had been 
occupied for only eleven months/19 Philadelphia for nine,220 while New 
212. Bums v. Erben, 40 N.Y. 463,469 (N.Y. 1869). 
213. See Davies, supra note 5 at 65~54. 
214. Bums, 40 N.Y. at 466. 
215. While New York's resistance to the probable cause arrest standard is unique 
among states with large urban populations in the mid-nineteenth century, New York was 
certainly not alone in having concerns about the new standard. See Davies, supra note S, at 
637 and n.246 (describing a North Carolina Supreme Court Justice's resistance to the 
probable cause arrest standard). 
216. See BURROWS & WALLACE, supra note 4, at 636; R.ICHARDSON, supra note 54, at 
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218. See RICHARDSON, supra note 54, at 15. 
219. DAVID McCULLOUGH, 1776 25 (2005) (describing the siege and occupation of 
Boston). 
220. JOHN W. JACKSON, WITH THE BRlTISH AftMY IN PHILADELPHIA, 1777- 1778 351 
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York was occupied for seven years during which time the houses of New 
Yorkers were frequently plundered?21 
Legislators were required to weigh in on the probable cause standard in 
1881 for reasons that appear to be accidental, or at least entirely unrelated 
to anything related to warrantless arrests. When New York codified its laws 
in 1829, the legislature provided for a Commission on Pleading and 
Practice to draft a Code of Civil Procedure and a Code of Criminal 
Procedure?22 The Commissioners' proposal was considered in 1849, 1850, 
and 1855, but never adopted?23 The legislature considered the Code again 
in 1881. The Code delineated rules for all aspects of the criminal justice 
system, not just the police. It did, however, include a variety of rules 
regarding officers, including the arrest standard. 224 
From the perspective of the police, it was particularly bad timing for 
elected officials to be publicly considering rules involving their discretion. 
Reports of police brutality became frequent in the late 1860s and continued 
to escalate into the 1870s?25 As one might expect, working class New 
Yorkers were most frequently the targets of acts of official violence. While 
upper class New Yorkers tended to appreciate the peacekeeping role of 
police, working class New Yorkers tended to have some degree of fear of 
the new institution?26 The class tensions in policing were aggravated by the 
police department's violent relationship with organized labor. Police efforts 
to contain labor demonstrations in the latter half of the nineteenth century 
frequently resulted in violence. Clubs were often used to break up strikes 
and protests.227 
One such confrontation left long memories. In 1874, several labor 
organizations planned a rally in Tompkins Square.228 Permits were required 
in New York after 1872 for any sort of public meeting?29 The groups were 
initially granted permission to hold their event, but then the permits were 
revoked the night before the event because of the concern ~olice had that 
"the proposed meeting would endanger the public peace."23 The concerns 
(1979) (describing occupation of Philadelphia). 
221. JUDITH L. VAN BusKIRK, GENEROUS ENEMIES: PATRIOTS AND LoYALISTS IN 
REVOLUTIONARY NEW YORK 23 (2002) (describing occupation ofNew York). 
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229. KELLER, supra note 90, at 174. 
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of the police were not utterly unfounded. Various groups that were to 
participate in the event had accused one another of having dan:flerous 
affiliations, fostering fears that labor groups were inciting revolution. 1 The 
last-minute revocation of the license was not, however, a recipe for 
minimizing civil unrest. Many participants arrived for. the event unaware 
that the permit had been revoked. Without telling the crowd to disperse, 
officers rushed into the crowd of 1 ,500 demonstrators with horses and 
clubs, battering an untold number with locust clubs and arresting forty-four 
on charges varying from disorderly conduct and incendiary speech to 
assault and battery?32 An editorial in the New York Herald stated, ''the 
average policeman, running a muck [sic] with his locust in band, is not to 
be relied on for the exercise of much discretion."233 
There were certainly defenders of the police after the Tompkins Square 
Riot who applauded the maintenance of order, just as police supporters bad 
always done, but there was a growing sense that the police were out of 
control.234 Newspapers increasingly reported random acts of violence by 
police.235 A number of seemingly innocent citizens were clubbed while 
sitting on their front stoops in the mid-1870s, leading the New York Times 
to describe "The Front Steps Crime."236 No clear consensus emerged on 
how to deal with the problem. Working class New Yorkers called for 
stricter regulation of the police while middle and upper class New Yorkers 
regarded police violence as the symptom of a larger problem of official 
corruption. 237 Working class New Yorkers also complained of corrupt 
231. !d. at 173. 
232. !d. at 174. Tompkins Square is no stranger to dramatic events. Ironically, there 
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officers profiting from extortion while brutalizing citizens, but rather than 
criminal sanctions, they understandably wanted the more direct remedy of 
I . . d" . 238 tm1ts on IscretiOn. 
By the 1890s, progressive reformers began to express more compassion 
toward the working-class victims of police violence and won public support 
for their view that :flood government, anti-corruption measures held the cure 
to police violence. 9 The Republican-led Wickersham Commission in 1895 
provided a supportive forum for working class citizens to publicly describe 
the abuse they suffered at the hands of police.240 In the 1880s, however, 
there were conflicting views of the appropriate remedy to very substantial 
problems within the police department. Increasing the discretion of officers 
to decide when to arrest, in light of patterns of abuse, was not politically 
expedient at a time when a number of New Yorkers were calling for greater 
restraints. 
Even though the proposed code the legislature considered in 1881 was 
first drafted in 1849, when the police department was in its infancy, the 
final version the legislature adopted was far less favorable to the police than 
the original draft. The 1849 version of the code included all of the 
justifications for a warrantless arrest that had been recognized in the United 
States before the creation of professional police forces. Under the proposed 
code, an officer could arrest a suspect without a warrant: 
1. For a public offense, committed or attempted in his presence; 
2. When the person arrested has committed a felony, although not in his 
presence; 
3. When a felony has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable 
cause for believing the person arrested to have committed it; [and] 
4. On a charge, made upon reasonable cause, of the commission of a 
felony by the party arrested. 241 
riots in 1806, 1826, 1834, 1837, 1849, 1855, 1857, 1863, 1870, 1874, and 1900. Eric H. 
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The Conunissioners in 1849 additionally proposed permitting officers to 
make an arrest for a felony at night, even if it should "afterwards appear 
that a felony had not been committed. "242 The Commissioners appear to 
have embraced the ages-old perceived need to allow greater security at 
night.243 Under English, colonial and early American laws, persons who 
could not explain their presence on the streets of a town at night could be 
detained until they were taken before magistrates to explain themselves.244 
The Code of Criminal Procedure adopted this warrantless standard from 
the proposed code but eliminated the fourth exception that allowed an 
officer to arrest on a complainant's charge.245 The New York Legislature 
had restored the very restrictive arrest standards that governed constables 
and watchmen in the eighteenth century. There is certainly an irony to this. 
New York had the largest police force in the country in the 1880s and no 
other legislature had moved to restrict the discretion of police?46 Just as 
New York's particular history explained the reluctance of its judiciary to 
adopt the probable cause standard for warrantless arrests, events occurring 
only in New York set the state's police regulation apart. Police violence 
was certainly not confined to New York in the latter part of the nineteenth 
century, but no other state with a modem metropolitan police force drafted 
a criminal procedure code in the 1880s.247 Unlike other state legislatures, 
New York's was forced to take the public's pulse on police regulation in 
1881, while the legislatures of other states could sit on the sidelines as 
courts continued to rely on mid-nineteenth century precedent. 
The unease with broad arrest powers New Yorkers demonstrated in 
1881 likely was not limited to residents of the Empire State, but the timing 
the facts giving rise to his suspicion occurred before his eyes, as described in exception (1), 
or a victim made a complaint to him, as in exception ( 4 ), or he had some extraordinary basis 
for suspecting the arrestee. See generally Davies, supra note 5. 
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of the Code of Criminal Procedure uniquely memorialized the public's view 
at a point when police power was particularly feared. The new limitation, 
however, appears to have had only a minimal effect on the police 
department, as relatively few cases can be located in which officers were 
sued for arresting a suspect when no felony had in fact been committed?48 
All the while, the more police-friendly probable cause arrest standard was 
gaining acceptance outside New York despite the concerns about arbitr~ 
arrests and police brutality raised by the creation of modem police forces.2 9 
The need for greater police authority-to control the streets and investigate 
crimes-had ushered in a new arrest standard. 
CONCLUSION 
Probable cause, as we understand it today, was not a sufficient basis for 
a law enforcement officer to make an arrest or seek a search warrant in late 
eighteenth-century America. However probable cause, as we understand it 
today, was more than sufficient for a victim to seek a search or arrest 
warrant, or instruct an officer to make an arrest. Probable cause was, in 
essence, a pleading requirement for victims. Law enforcement officers, by 
contrast, were required to observe the crime in progress, or wait for a 
victim's complaint, before they could even seek a magistrate's 
authorization for a search or arrest. 
The modern understanding of probable cause is an evidentiary 
threshold that may be satisfied by any person with information "sufficient 
to warrant a person of reasonable caution in believing that a crime ha[ s] 
been committed" or is about to be committed.250 This evidentiary threshold 
may be satisfied by any person with evidence bearing on the question of 
whether there is suspicion; the modern standard does not depend on the 
identity of the person claiming to have probable cause or the type of crime 
investigated. More is required of victims than was required during the 
Framing Era and less is required of law enforcement than was required 
during the Framing Era. Victims must demonstrate the basis of their 
suspicion while law enforcement officers are no longer dependent on 
victims. 
The need for greater security forced society to trust law enforcement 
officers with greater discretion-a trust that was not readily granted and not 
well-earned. At the same time the realities of urban life were forcing 
Americans to place the same faith in law enforcement officers that they 
placed in private citizens, the public began to lose its faith in the integrity of 
248. The first appellate case on this issue following the 1881 Code appears to have been 
Stearns v. Titus, 85 N.E. 1077 (1908). Carolyn Ramsey has noted a similar ineffectiveness of 
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private complainants. The citizenry was unwilling to entrust Temperance 
Watchmen, the teetotaling private citizens who sought warrants against 
their less rigid neighbors, to direct the state's searching apparatus. The 
citizen-informants were disliked for their zeal that led them to make 
allegations on less than reliable evidence as much as they were for their 
thorough investigations accurately identifying liquor law violators. Their 
enthusiasm for a despised law ·thus prompted a new, more heavily 
scrutinized method for citizen-requested searches. 
Probable cause is, of course, something of a universal standard for 
authorizing searches or arrests in the twenty-first century and has been for 
some time. But the standard's ubiquitous quality is of more recent origin 
than a reading of the Supreme Court's criminal decisions--or even the text 
of the Constitution itself.- might suggest. 
